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 Abstract
 
Logic, as a discipline, a tool for making knowledge,
 
and a way of thinking, has been intimately connected to
 
composition since the dawn of literacy. This paper surveys
 
the definition and etytnology of logic, briefly traces the
 
history of its reiiation to composition, and examines how
 
logic, both formal and informal, has been incorporated into
 
the teaching of composition in American colleges. Cultural
 
and intellectual,forces that impact the relationship between
 
composition and logic are discussed, providing a context for
 
recommendations regarding the place of logic in the
 
curriculum.
 
Logic and rhetoric were taught together in ancient
 
Greece and Rome and in Christian Europe for over twenty
 
centuries. Since; the mid^ the 19th Century, the
 
discipline of formal logic has grown exponentially, and
 
today's students learn little or none of it. Meanwhile, the
 
three-year rhetoric course common in American colleges a
 
century ago has been condensed into less than a year. The
 
discipline of,informal logic arose to fill the vacuum by
 
applying logicai; principles to the creation and analysis of
 
discourse. Modern composition textbooks include material oh
 
writing logically and avoiding logical fallacy. But many
 
presentations of logic in composition textbooks are faulty,
 
• ■ iii ■' ■ ■ ■ ■ • • ' 
 and other practiGes, such as auto-biographical writing, are
 
competing successfully with the traditional, logic-based
 
pedagogy for instructional time and interest. This is
 
occurring at a tirtie when logic is increasingly suspect
 
within the university, and in the context of a popular youth 
culture that is strongly anti-rational. As a result, and in 
spite of various reform movements, the ability of students 
to think critically and write logically has continued to 
slip. ^ ■ ■ , ■ ' : ^ V' 
This paper's findings are that the position of logic in
 
the curriculum needs to be strengthened to enable students
 
to make sense of what they are asked to learn and
 
participate in the discourse community of their chosen
 
field; that one or two courses taken as freshmen are
 
insufficient for this purpose; and that instruction in
 
logical principles needs to begin early and be presented
 
coherently. Some recommendations for curriculum are
 
advanced. A philosophical defense of logic is offered
 
against "anti-foundationalism."
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Several years ago (has it really taken this long to get
 
to the introduction ot my jaas^ it- has), Dr.
 
Haviland, director of the Writing Center at CSUSB, referred
 
to me a student, "Carlos," whose writing showed deficiency
 
in logic. His opinion paper Was laced with professor^
 
comments that he found irritating: "Not a valid inference,"
 
"Be specific," "What is your authority for this?" and so on,
 
and it had a failing grade. Carlos was frustrated. He was
 
also determined to succeed, on his own terms if possible, on
 
the instructor's terms if necessary. He did not share his
 
instructor's low opinion of his paper, but was willing to
 
change it, especially if given reasons more meaningful than
 
the coercion of grades and graduation credit. He wanted
 
reasons why his own reasoning had been judged insufficient.
 
In essence, Carlos was challenging American higher education
 
to explain and justify some of its basic premises. Dr.
 
Haviland assigned him to me because I was rumored to possess
 
a logical mind.
 
Energized by Dr. Haviland's confidence and determined
 
to help Carlos succeed (lest it be discovered that I didn't
 
have a logical mind),; I met with Carlos several times that
 
quarter. He had the sort of inquiring mind that makes
 
teaching interesting, and maddening. His questions and
 
comments were to the point. What's a valid inference? What
 
does he mean, be specific? I am specific! This is an - ;
 
opinion paper; why do I nee4 an authority? It was soonr
 
evident that Carlos had an aptitude for logic at least as 
high as his tutor's, and I became convinced that the faulty 
reasoning evident in his writing did not reflect a want of ■ 
ability. Of that> he had plenty. Of formal training in 
reasoning skills, he had had little, but he was getting it 
now in college, and he had that faculty of intuifii'-e^^ ^ ^ ; :: 
reasoning that Aristotle identified as the source of 
knowledge-making (naus, as the Greeks called it). More 
experience in persuasive writing would doubtless have made 
this assignment easier; at the point at which I joined his 
education, he needed help quickly, and I was at a loss as to 
where to begin. He had missed so much, it seemed. As I 
tried to set priorities on what to teach him, I came to see 
that one quarter of instruction was not enough time to learn 
the language of academia. But we muddled through, and with 
a change of attitude and a lot of effort, he managed to pass 
the course.
 
What I tried to do was to make him use the reasoning 
skills he already employed without hesitation to question ■' 
authority whenever the opportunity to do so presented 
itself. The epiphany, as I recall it, came during one of 
our verbal fencing matches about course requirements. Why, 
he wanted to know, was it necessary in an opinion paper to 
use rigorously correct reasoning, when he knew how he felt 
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about the 	issue, the instructor already haci hi opinion, and
 
all opinions are respected in the academy? GoOd question,
 
although dlert ireshmen soon learn that the third premise
 
ish'fc true, nor shouid it be. The exchange that followed,
 
cleaned up a bit to make me appear a better tutor than I
 
was, went 	something like this:
 
Met	 Good question. (Pause) Am I right in saying
 
that you feel entitled to a reasonable
 
explanation for the requirement that your
 
paper employ sound reasoning?
 
Carlos:	 Yea., Vik' ■ ■■■ ;: 
Me:	 That in the absence of a reasonable
 
explanation, you would be less inclined to
 
accept this requirement?
 
Carlos	 That's right.
 
Me:	 Would you say that your classmates, and
 
people generally, share your feeling that
 
reasons should be advanced to justify what
 
they are asked to do?
 
Carlos	 Sure. Everybody feels that way.
 
Me:	 Would you then deny to your readers an
 
entitlement that you claim for yourself?
 
Carlos: [Puzzled look, followed by a dawn of
 
recognition, a barely suppressed grin, and
 
;v w better writing.]
 
I wish things really were so easy.
 
The community of composition teachers has long bemoaned
 
the difficulty students like Carlos have with developing and
 
arguments. Evidence for this lies in the
 
exasperated sighs one hears in faculty meetings and grading
 
sessions and in the prevalence of chapters on logical
 
development, or at least on logical fallacies, that appear
 
in most composition textbooks. The widespread perception
 
that entering freshmen, more so than previous generations,
 
have trouble writing logically, has had an impact on
 
composition pedagogy. Starting in the 1970's, a critical
 
thinking movement has led to the insertion of required
 
courses in critical thinking for undergraduates; this
 
movement has percolated down into secondary education as
 
part of the reforms of the 1980's. But the problem has not
 
been solved. The exposure that high school students get to
 
logic, reasoning skills or critical thinking varies widely
 
in content and coherence. A lucky few may have access to a
 
course in logic or general philosophy; but in none of the
 
half-dozen school districts in which I have taught or
 
observed, nor in the private school where I now teach, does
 
a high school diploma signify mastery of basic logic. If
 
Carlos comes to us knowing what a valid inference is, it is
 
because a good teacher somewhere thought he ought to know
 
it. When we consider that Carlos' popular culture is
 
profoundly anti-intellectual, and that logic itself is
 
suspect in some educational circles, it should not surprise
 
us that he should have trouble negotiating the persuasive
 
essay assignments that some composition teachers still
 
require of college freshmen.
 
Our classes are well-stoGked with Carloses, it seems to
 
me. Smart and engaging, they often see themselves aS more
 
creative than logical, prefer writing journals or poems to
 
essays, and write "I feel" in situations where convention
 
would call for "I think;" They are more comfortable with
 
narrative or reactive writing than with analytical or
 
persuasive writing, and as Applebee has noted in the context
 
of high school, they often fall back on "embedding long
 
stretches of narrative within a global analytic
 
frame"-^switching modes inappropriately--to help them
 
through a difficult assignment (185). Applebee reports that
 
high school students are nevertheless "efficient language
 
learners" (186) who develop coping strategies to see them
 
through new or difficult writing situations, and voices the
 
belief that if they lack skill in certain writing
 
situations, it is probably because they have not been
 
sufficiently challenged. I think they've been trained, by
 
their high school teachers and by other,subtle but powerful
 
cultural influences, to feel more comfortable with
 
expressing their feelings than with defending their
 
opinions. In other words, in spite of the critical thinking
 
movement and the sporadic waves Of "refonri" that have swept
 
over the public schools in California and elsewhere, the
 
ability of our youth to "think straight," at least as
 
manifested in their writing, has continued to slip.
 
I hope that our tutor-ial session? to
 
Carlos; they were a boon to me. His questions, and the
 
questions they led to, forced me to re-examine the whole
 
idea of logicV What is it, really, and what relation does
 
it have to writing? Is the study of logic an answer to the
 
writing problems of our students? Is logic a method for the
 
discovery of truth, as Aristotle thought, or is it a
 
window-dressing for argument, as Carlos suspected? If the
 
latter, isn't our insistence on it in a sense hypocritical?
 
Do we have time to teach logic as part of freshmen
 
composition, and if so, what part of it do we teach? Carlos
 
got me thinking, and in the process gave me a thesis topic;
 
who can put a value on that?
 
This paper will look at logic from the standpoint not
 
of a logician, but of a student and teacher of composition.
 
The first section will briefly define logic and survey the
 
fascinating etymology of the term. Section II will trace,
 
also briefly, the history of logic as a discipline and
 
comment on its relationship to composition. Section III
 
will examine ways in which authors of composition textbooks
 
in recent years have attempted to incorporate logical
 
principles into the teaching of composition. A fourth
 
section will examine cultural and intellectual currents that
 
impact the teaching of composition in the 1990's. A
 
conGluding seGtion will look at logie and Gomposition
 
presGriptively, with particular referehqe to the teaching of
 
freshmen composition.
 
The definition of logic offered in 1910 by Walter Skeat
 
in his Dictionary of the English Language, "the science of
 
reasoning correctly," while adequate as a starting point,
 
does not begin to cover cdntetnporary usages, ahd belongs
 
therefore to a simpler age. The Oxford English Dictionary
 
gives six definitipns, documenting occurrences of the word
 
as far back as Chaucer (1386) and beyond. Random House
 
gives pretty much the sairie six, starting with "The science
 
that investigates the principles governing correct or
 
reliable inference." As a primary definition, this one will
 
serve our purposes. Though it lacks the august simplicity
 
of Skeat's, a century of intense philosophical give and take
 
is embedded in the terms "reliable" and "inference," and in
 
the implied difference between "reliable" and "correct."
 
Since I shall argue that our students need to engage this
 
give and take in order to make sense of higher education,
 
let alone master its written language, it seems fit to
 
choose a definition that gives a nod to the advances of our
 
age. The nod is more than a passing one. To say not merely
 
"the science," but "the science that investigates the
 
principles goverriihg," is to add. a few removes between the
 
knower and that which is known. :The word investicrates
 
especially implies a process, a search for something that
 
may or may not be found. "Science," by itself, has a more
 
static sound to it and seems to suggest a settled system
 
which, if followed, ensures conclusions that are verifiably
 
correct. We have grown to be wary of such conclusions.
 
Random House continues with "a particular method of
 
reasoning or argumentation." It is not surprising, in our
 
age of relativism, that a word once associated with first
 
principles has taken on such a markedly relativistic
 
denotation, or that this denotation has worked its way up to
 
the number two slot in a major dictionary of the language.
 
By this definition there can be several, perhaps competing
 
logics. The principles or methods subsumed by logic can now
 
vairy with the situation, or the logician, or both. It also
 
allows logic to mean the opposite of "correct or reliable
 
inference," as in the sentence: "You may think you're
 
right, but your logic sucks." One hears this usage on
 
campus these days. The relativistic definition might be
 
expanded to include not just "methods," which implies
 
thinking about reasoning, but also the relational patterns,
 
unconsciously arrived at, that often inform or underlie all
 
manner of human constructs. Thus Mina Shaughnessy: "...a
 
8
 
teacher who would work with BW students might well begin by-

trying to understand the logic of their mistakes ..." (13).
 
Logic in such usages is not only relativistic, but heavily
 
subjective, leading us to ask whether all logic might be, to
 
a degree, subjective. The modern answer is, to a degree,
 
yes. The subjectivity of logic is an academic debate that
 
cuts across the disciplines. Psychology and sociology tell
 
us that, as individuals and members of groups, we vary quite
 
a bit on what premises we think important and what methods
 
we use to proceed from them to form conclusions. These
 
considerations have important practical consequences.
 
"Logic" told George Bush that Iraq wouldn't dare invade
 
Kuwait; a different "logic" told Saddam Hussein that he
 
could get away with it. Logic that doesn't account for
 
subjectivity is of limited use in human affairs.
 
The third definition offered by Random House, "The ;
 
system or principles applicable to any branch of knowledge
 
or study,i "acknowledges the futility of one of Aristotle's
 
fondest hopes--that there was a universal system of inquiry
 
that applied to all disciplines and united all knowledge-

seeking activity. This is what Aristotle meant by logic,
 
and he thought he had discovered it. The definition before
 
us counterbalances the possibility of a single science of
 
correct reasoning (definition #1) with the idea that each
 
discipline, each science, each art (Webster's New World
 
Dictionary adds art to the list) has its own logic. Two and
 
a half millennia of Western scholarship have gradually
 
institutionalized logic's relatiyity. Gradually; but our
 
century has seen a great acceleration of this process, in
 
spite of attempts, such as Bertrand Russell's with logic and
 
mathematics and the Vienna Circle's with logical positivism,
 
to find new grounds for unity. As academia comes to reflect
 
more the world'S cuitUraT diversity, it is predictable that
 
those advocating piluralism will find the idea of a unifying
 
logic increasingly suspect.
 
Returning briefly to art, logic is Suspect there, too.
 
We dichotomize creativity and logic, just as we do right
 
brain and left, even when the careers of such dual-brained
 
geniuses as Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) ought to caution
 
Us against easy generalization. But critics are
 
surprisingly fond of the word. To cite two examples from
 
the same page of a recent New Yorker: Film critic Terrence
 
Rafferty refers to the "clear, simple thriller logic" of In
 
the Line of Fire; his colleague Michael Sragow finds that
 
"(screenwriter Sydney) Pollack and his team do come up with
 
a more logical line of action" for The Firm than was present
 
in John Grisham's "vacuous" book. A harrative may create
 
its own premises, but if they are flawed, or if the story
 
proceeds along lines that reveal internal inconsistencies/
 
or that contradict the stable assumptions of the critic, a
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work of art may be assailed as illogical.
 
Definition #4, "Reason gr sound judgment, as in
 
utterances or actions," is a colloquial offshoot of #1. It
 
is to informal logic what #1 is to formal logic; more on
 
these terms later. Moving along, "Convincing forcefulness;
 
inexorable truth or persuasiveness," number 5 in Random
 
House, seems confusing at first reading. Which is it, truth
 
or persuasiveness? :On reflection, we see that it captures
 
the rhetorical function of logic. If a condlusion follows,
 
or seems to follow, from logical principles, it will be more
 
persuasive than if it does not. Conversely, the perception
 
of logical fallacy, whether the perception is fair or not,
 
will cast doubt on a conclusion that might in fact be true.
 
The "Carlos" I described above latched quickly onto the idea
 
that logic is not something we use to reach our conclusions,,
 
but rather a process that we apply after the fact to
 
convince others of their truth. In this idea he has much
 
historical backing, from the Sophists to modern scholars of
 
repute, such as Wili Durant, who thought logic too deadly
 
dull for general readership. Logic and rhetoric are
 
sometimes thought of as gpposites, but in concept and in
 
practice their relationship is complex, and almost surely
 
predates written language. Rhetoric is a function of logic;
 
logic is a part of rhetoric; whether one can be taught apart
 
from the other is a question that gets to the heart of this
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'paper :
 
Definition number six in both RH and the OED relates to
 
the machine I'm staring at now; Webster's expresses it as
 
"the systemized interconnection of digital switching
 
functions ..." This may be a metaphor for what goes on in
 
the brain when we attempt to be logical. Logic is hard; the
 
possibility that computers may take it over is tantalizing.
 
But with computers as with the syllogism, the major
 
impediment to logical discovery is not the abstract method,
 
but its application to the real world. Too, the logic of
 
computers depends on the logic of the human beings who
 
design and program them. He who would design the chess
 
program to beat Kasparov must figure out how to beat
 
Kasparov. Viewed in this way, one function of the computer
 
is to capture for the use of the rest of us, more
 
efficiently than writing ever could for Aristotle, the
 
advances in logic made by the anonymous geniuses at
 
Microsoft.
 
We ought to pause for a moment on this point. Plato,
 
.in The Phaedrus. shows Socrates objecting to the new
 
technology of writing on grounds that fail to convince us
 
moderns, as they obviously failed to convince Plato--that
 
reliance on the written word sacrifices the transactional
 
power of oral communication to assure, or increase the
 
likelihood of, accurate transmission of ideas, and leads to
 
12
 
intellectual laziness. No doubt/ literaGy has"h its
 
costs. Few, perhaps none of today's learned Ph.D.'s could
 
take on Socrates in oral debate on basic questions, or so I
 
suspect. But writing enabled Newton to Stand on the
 
shoulders of giantSy as well, as preserving the logic of
 
Aristotle, and writing has at least this advantage over
 
computers: In order to access the wisdom that writing
 
preserves, one has to understand what is written. Computers
 
threaten to do it all for us. I read recently of a
 
programmer who taught his machine to write a romance novel,
 
After this dubious achievement, it won't be long until
 
harried undergraduates will be able to punch in a subject
 
and a point of view, push the print button, and have in hand
 
an opinion paper of the kind Carlos was struggling with,
 
perfectly edited, or with just enough logical fallacy and
 
sentence error programmed in to deflect suspicion. It's
 
coming. The insidious thing about computers is that it puts
 
power in the user's hands without requiring a modicum of
 
understanding of the bits and bytes that make the technology
 
work, much less of its mighty logic, the product of a
 
million hours of mental labor, retrieved in a micro-second.
 
Literacy makes readers of the many and authors of the few;
 
will computers make reasoners of the few, and something
 
else, something sub-human, out of the rest of us?
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Webster's traces logic to the Indo-European base leg
 
meaning to gather, from whence derives the Latin verb
 
leaere. to collect. It would be fascinating to know the
 
precise steps by which gathering became assbciated
 
linguistically with reasoning. We may speculate,that the
 
act of gathering implies discriminating or sorting according
 
to pre-established categories--green vs ripe, edible vs
 
npn-edible, ferrous ys non-ferrous. So during argument, we
 
gather and sort our data according to whether they
 
contribute to the point we are making. To an emerging
 
civilization at the dawn of literacy, teaching itself the
 
art of reasoned deba:te, the association between gathering
 
and reasoning would seem, well, logical. In any event, 1^
 
became the Greek logos, moved to Latin as locrica
 
(reasoning), to French as logigue, and thence to Middle
 
English as logike (Chaucer's word).
 
Logos is a big, big word in ancient Greek texts. Its
 
translation appears to be problematic. Webster's gives "a
 
word, reckoning, thought," but this range doesn't begin to
 
cover the ground for modern translators of the classics.
 
Terence Irwin, translating The Gorgias. renders the word as
 
"speech," "argument," "account", "rational account,"
 
"discussion" and "statements," according to Plato's shifting
 
context (Irwin, p. 16, 17, 24, 33, 33, and 42,
 
respectively). Thus; in one word did the Greeks unify
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speech, thought, reasoning and argument. Logos has also
 
journeyed intact, through philosophy and theology, to arrive
 
in the present as an English noun meaning both "reason,
 
thought of as ... the controlling principle of the universe
 
and as being manifested by speech," and "the Word, or
 
ultimate reality; esp., the creative and sustaining spirit
 
of God as revealed in Jesus: John I" (Webster's). The
 
heavy and varied freight that Logos has borne over the ages
 
has made it a convenient vehicle for certain contemporary
 
thinkers, such as some academic feminists, who use the word
 
to denote the dominant way of knowing that is logical,
 
linear, abstract, principled and masculine, and contrast
 
those qualities with the emotional, recursive, sensual,
 
practical and feminine. As a prefix, logo- relates to words
 
or speech, as in logorrhea: "excessive talkativeness, esp.
 
when incoherent and uncontrollable," a malady that afflicts
 
many of us from time to time (Webster's). The suffix -logy
 
also derives from logos. Thus, the root logos contains
 
within it the concepts pf human speech, reasoned argument,
 
the origin of the universe, a unifying method of inquiry,
 
the distinctive methodology of each science, a large part of
 
rhetoric, Jesus Christ, gender differences, and the inner
 
workings of computers. We may generalize that logos and its
 
descendants form one of the primary sets of phonemes by
 
which Western languages have expressed the search for order
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to hold at bay the chaos that presses in upon human life; in
 
the etymology of logic are inscribed many of the problems
 
that such a search entails
 
II
 
"Aristotle created the science of logic: this is simple
 
historical fact" (Ferguson 31). This statement is surely
 
over-simplified, but it holds up when logic is understood to
 
mean a formal written system of rules for correct reasoning,
 
and when proper allowances are made for the fact that the
 
Organon. as his logical treatises came to be called, did not
 
arise in a vacuum. He had help. It would be useful here to
 
consider the nature of that help. The circumstances
 
surrounding Aristotle's invention of formal logic have
 
relevance for composition studies.
 
The cross-fertilization between Greece and Egypt is the
 
subject of much contemporary scholarship that may someday
 
make Ferguson's claim for Aristotle less simple. No
 
Egyptian logical text has been found that would refute the
 
claim, but Greece and Egypt had traditions of informal logic
 
and oral debate that pre-dated Aristotle by several
 
centuries, at least. Zeno, writing a century before
 
Aristotle, had used his famous paradoxes to ridicule the
 
reliance on logic that he observed in his contemporaries.
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The Sophists had taught the use of informal logic to serve
 
rhetorical ends; the Socrates of Plato's dialogues took them
 
to task, in The Phaedrus and elsewhere, for specious
 
reasoning. By the time Aristotle arrived in Athens to study
 
with Plato, the claims and limitations of informal
 
logic--the application of reasoning skills to practical
 
problems of life--had been debated and written about in
 
depth.
 
Developments in religion and politics worked in
 
Aristotle's favor. The gradual decay of the old religion, a
 
cause for anguished debate and social unrest, meant that new
 
explanations had to be found fpr natural phenomena, opening
 
the door for science. Scientific advances in their turn
 
further discredited the old religion, but not without
 
resistance, so that scientists arid philosophers had to argue
 
their positions constantly, not only among themselves, but
 
vis-a-vis a threatened lay public. The limited democracy
 
practiced by citizens of the Greek polis put a premium on
 
rhetorical skills. Logic is a large part of persuasion,
 
becoming ever larger as a discourse community becomes more
 
sophisticated, more attentive to fallacy and more demanding
 
of proof. In the political climate of 4th century B.C.
 
Athens, logic mattered. Of course, logic in the service of
 
rhetoric is a malleable thing. In such a situation, people
 
inevitably would be interested in a formalized logic that
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could inform rhetoric and guard against its abuses. The
 
demand for formal logic surely predated its existence. The
 
table was set for Aristotle.
 
To the influences of informal logic, religion (or, its
 
decline), politics, philosophy and science as it then
 
existed, we must certainly add mathematics. In an important
 
sense, the Greeks invented mathematics, too. In retrospect,
 
this shouldn't surprise us. The relationship between logic
 
and mathematics has been speculated upon by many
 
philosophers throughout history, and finally demonstrated in
 
this century by Russell and Whitehead. Of course, numbers
 
and counting and basic arithmetic existed before the Greeks
 
in many places, including Egypt and Mesopotamia. But as the
 
Britannica expresses it, "... what was distinctive of the
 
Greeks' contribution to mathematics--and what in effect made
 
them the creators of 'mathematics' as the term is usually
 
understood--was its development as a theoretical discipline.
 
This means two things: mathematical statements are general,
 
and they are confirmed by proof" (vol. 23, p. 607). These
 
are both attributes of Aristotelian logic, and the influence
 
of mathematics on Aristotle was certainly considerable.
 
Plato was his teacher; Plato's friend Theactatus was one of
 
the first to gaze through the shrinking interstices that
 
separate integers and fractions, and glimpse the vast
 
Pacific of irrational numbers. More to Aristotle's direct
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benefit was the use of variables to replace numbers in
 
geometric formulae and other math applications, Aristotle
 
adapted this practice to formal logic. The use of letters
 
to represent terTns and propositions is a qua:ntum leap whose
 
simplicity should not obscure its importance, for it enabled
 
logic to free itself of specific questions and become
 
"general." Of course, this freeing of logic from specific
 
questions makes problematic the applicatipn of the general
 
or formal system back to the real world. It is the problem
 
of application that, has drawn the most criticism to formal
 
logic. But suspending such criticism for the moment, the
 
use of symbols to replace specific terms or propositions,
 
,and the operations to be conducted among them, was as
 
integral to the development of formal logic as variables
 
were to theoretical inath. Aristotle was aiming for
 
reliability. The system he sought was one in which
 
arguments were to proceed reliably from premises to
 
conclusion, so that if the premises were true, the
 
conclusion would have to be true. Math was the model for
 
his logic, and the use of symbols, in addition to being
 
convenient, was part of the conceptual framework.
 
In no other known society did conditions so conducive
 
to the invention of formal logic come together in so happy a
 
fashion. But cruder attempts did originate independently
 
elsewhere. Chinese scholar Wing-Tsit Chan identifies the
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"Neo-Moists," named after philosopher Mo Tsu and the school
 
he founded, as haying established a "utilitarian humanism"
 
with a basis in logic in thd 4th and 3rd centuries B.C.
 
This school produced a rudimentary formal logic with seven
 
methods of argumentation and other advances, but never
 
progressed "beyond the stage of preliminaries, which was
 
reached in Greece by the Sophists ..." (Britannica. vol. 23
 
p. 242), and yielded to the anti-intellectual movement of
 
Chuang Tsu and the Yin-Yang school. The Ned-Moists had been
 
rivals of Confucianism, suggesting that the antipathy
 
between the influence of China's greatest philosopher and
 
the cause Of formal logic made the emergence of the latter
 
unlikely in China, even had Chinese philosophy, with its
 
emphasis on ethics and the solution of human problems, been
 
more disposed to accept it. In any event, as Chan expresses
 
it, "It is unfortunate that this logical movement died
 
almost in its infancy, and thus deprived China of a
 
disinterested/ analyticai, and scientific system of
 
logic..." (Chan, 47).
 
In India, logic started later and progressed further,
 
spanning a tradition of twenty centuries according to
 
historian Sarvepalli:Radhakrishnan. The Aristotle of India
 
wgis perhaps Gautama, whose sutras may date as early as the
 
3rd century B.C. Before Gautama, a tradition of formal
 
debate tournaments existed among educated elite in India
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that corresponded roughly to the dialectics of the Sophists.
 
From this traditioh evolved several schools of logic, most
 
notable the Nyaya. Logic flourishsd in the first few
 
centuries A.D., becoming one of five subjects that made up a
 
"pentivium" of classical Hindu education: Kavya
 
(literature), Nataka (drama), Alamkara (rhetoric), Tarka
 
(logic), and Vyakarana (grammar) (Radhakrishnan 32). Not
 
all of the ancient Hindu texts have been translated into
 
Western languages, but as far as we know, the formal logic
 
that developed independently in India didn't progress much
 
further than the Chinese version. "Compared with the logic
 
of the ancient Greeks, Indian logic is not very impressive"
 
(Britannica, vol. 23, 241).
 
It's possible, maybe, that at some time and place,
 
formal logic occurred in a pre-literate society and died
 
before it could be written down, but it seems doubtful.
 
Reason itself is a universal human attribute, but a formal
 
logic approaching in complexity:even a single book of
 
Aristotle's must be read, in depth and at some leisure, to
 
be assimilated; and written down, I suppose, in order to be
 
composed in the first place. I'm generalizing from my own
 
inadequacy here. There probably are geniuses somewhere in
 
the world who could keep it all in their heads, just as
 
there are grand masters who conduct simultaneous blindfold
 
exhibitions in chess. But who, without a board and pieces.
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could invent chess enti in his imagination? And with
 
whom would he play? Plainly put, formal logic is hard.
 
Aristotle's main Gontribution to it, the sy-llogism, is said
 
to comprise only a corner of the expanding terrain of formal
 
logic, but it quickly becomes complex. It starts with the
 
four combinations of two dualities, universal-particular and
 
positive-negative; constructs from them syllogisms each 
consisting of two premises and a conclusion; and further 
distinguishes three "figures" that vary according to the 
order of the terms. Each figure has sixteen possible 
pairings of premises, making a total of 64 if the fourth 
figure, omitted by Aristotle, is included. This is the 
number of squares on the chessboard, and chess does not 
exceed in complexity the possible variations of the 
syllogism, especially when the enthymeme (a syllogism with 
one of the premises made contingent, rather than taken as 
true), is introduced. It would seem impossible to negotiate 
one's way through this maze without writing down each step. 
Not that scholars haven't tried to commit the thing to 
memory. A 13th century wit named Peter the Spaniard ■ 
"devised a barbaric mnemonic in doggerel Latin displaying 
all of the moods" [combinations of the dualities] that form 
valid patterns, starting with BARBARA, which caught on, so 
that BARBARA became the name of the first mood. (Ferguson 
37) (The A's represent the universal positive term, i.e.. 
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all cats are mammals). But BARBARA depended upon written
 
symbols keyed to a written text. Giving all the respect
 
that is due the memory capacity of pre-literate bards, scops
 
and holy men, it's hard to imagine formal logic existing
 
without writing. The Greek phonetic alphabet, in existence
 
for perhaps six centuries before Aristotle, was a logical
 
tool of huge importance. Ayer, in a radio debate with
 
Father Copleston about logical positivism, suggested that
 
"the belief of Western philosophers in substance was verf
 
much bound up with the subject-predicate form of most
 
sentences in Western languages" (Ayer, Meaning, 35). The
 
belief in substance, one might add, gave Western
 
philosophers the confidence in sensory perception to assert
 
first principles upon which science, or logic, could build.
 
The question of whether language creates the world view of a
 
culture or merely reflects it is peripheral to this paper,
 
but either way, the structure of the Greek language,
 
including its written alphabet, gave Aristotle an edge over
 
Mo Tsu and his followers in China.
 
All of this suggests to me that the relationship
 
between logic and composition is less one-sided than I was
 
used to thinking, before researching this paper. The
 
importance of logic to writing has generally been taken as
 
given, although there has been much disagreement as to the
 
degree and nature of that importance. Most contemporary
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critics of logic-based pedagogy don't claim that logic has
 
no value, Pb advocate that writing hot be logical• Rather,
 
they may propose with Miter, that instructors give more
 
emphasis to autobiographical writing, or with Acevedo, that
 
professors pay more heed to the affective side of their
 
students, not to oppose logic per se but to correct ;
 
perceived imbalances in the pedagogy, or in the way it's
 
delivered. The assumption, inherited from antiquity and the
 
Middle Ages and held by many educators up to recent times,
 
that the study of formal logic sharpens the mind and leads
 
to better writing, is no longer widely held, judging from
 
current educational practices; but informal logic,
 
supposedly schooled by formal logic but adapted to the "real
 
world," is still an integral part of the writing curriculum.
 
Logic is important to writing. Our emphasis on thesis
 
statements, paragraph organization, transitional statements,
 
supporting evidence, etc.. proclaims our belief that this is
 
true. Conversely, Writing is important to logic, not in the
 
abstract sense, but certainly in the practical. If the idea
 
of formal logic is valid, its validity doesn't depend on
 
human expression, written or otherwise. But for logic to
 
exist, in a form accessible to humans, it must be written
 
down. It requires a sophisticated literacy to be understood
 
and built upon. It requires composition. The relationship
 
between logic and composition is thus a kind of symbiosis.
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Formal logic needs composition in order to exist in the
 
world; composition requires formal logic, or at least
 
principles derived from it, in order to achieve coherence,
 
not to mention persuasiveness in most rhetorical situations.
 
It would be hard to teach one without teaching some elements
 
of the other.
 
Aristotelian logic barely survived antiquity, and
 
advanced but little through the Middle Ages and the
 
Renaissance. Most or all of Aristotle's work was translated
 
into Latin, but only apart of it survived the collapse of
 
Rome and passed directly into Christian Europe. The logical
 
texts fared better than most. Several of them in Greek were
 
available to Boethius as he awaited his execution in 524.
 
While in prison he translated them to Latin and added his
 
own commentary, in the process making "a powerful
 
contribution to the creation of a Latin vocabulary of
 
logical terms" (Copleston 54). Apparently perceiving a
 
relationship between logic and composition theory such as it
 
then existed, "he transmitted to the medievals the
 
distinction, attributed by Porphyry to the Peripatetics,
 
between written, spoken and mental discourse ..." (54).
 
Deprived of most of the Aristotle corpus, the Christian
 
scholars of the Middle Ages knew Aristotle primarily as a
 
logician. Boethius' pupil Cassiodorus divided up the seven
 
liberal arts (compiled earlier by the pagan scholar
 
25
 
Martianus Capella) into the Trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and
 
logic, or dialectic) and the Quadrivium (arithmetic,
 
geometry, music and astronomy). These two courses of study
 
"formed the basis of medieval education" (56) for young
 
scholars who aspired to the higher calling of theology.
 
Theology had an anesthetizing effect on philosophical
 
speculation during the first Christian millennium.
 
Christianity purports to explain the crea.tioh of the
 
universe, stipulates ethical conduct, and answers all
 
questions about the purpose of life (the soul's salvation).
 
It's effect on logic was not so drastic as we might expect,
 
given the modern tendency to see reason and faith as
 
contrary impulses. In a theocratic society, reason must be
 
subordinated to revealed truth, so logic as a means of
 
discovering truth is out. Logic may serve as a handmaiden
 
to theology, though--and it did. The handmaiden role was a
 
familiar one for logic. Orgarion means a tool or implement,
 
and logic had been conceived as a tool by Aristotle. No
 
intellectual tool was ever worked harder than logic during
 
the Middle Ages. Doctrihe supplied for Christian Europe a
 
new set of first principles, some of which (Virgin Birth,
 
Resurrection, transubstantiation of sacramental bread and
 
wine) departed radically from ordinary human experience. A
 
logic that could make plausible such apparently fanciful
 
phenomena would be usefiil indeed to the Church. Of course.
 
26
 
a logic that proceeded from first principles derived not
 
from doctrine but from tangible reality would be intolerably
 
threatening to institutionalized religion. Theology
 
encouraged logic as a subordinate discipline while keeping a
 
wary eye on its subversive possibilities.
 
What Christian who ever doubted has not turned at one
 
time or another to reason to prove the existence of God, or
 
to explain the presence of evil in a world created by a God
 
who so loved the world that he ...? Medieval proofs of
 
God's existence became increasingly popular and arcane, and
 
not just among doubters. A believer who takes Christian
 
doctrine as beyond doubt but still possesses intellectual
 
curiosity, and there seem to have been many such, might wish
 
to investigate the nature of his faith, and employ logic as
 
a tool in that enterprise. Copleston chronicles the
 
attempts of a diverse succession of medieval theologians to
 
do just that, starting with Anselm and Abelard in the 11th
 
century. Some wrote in the Platonic tradition, which in
 
12th century Chartes, for example, meant deriving their
 
cosmology from Plato's Timaeus, and (referring to William of
 
Conches) "[identifying] the world-soul of the Timaeus with
 
the Holy Spirit" (88). Others, such as John of Salisbury,
 
used Aristotelian logic as a touchstone. Whatever their
 
orientation or methods, these writers sought to reconcile
 
faith and reason. By this enterprise, they sought
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simultaneously to reGoncile Christian doctrine with the
 
wisdom of antiquity and to fend off challenges to their
 
faith from the outside.
 
Islam in particular was a persistent and formidable
 
challenge to Christianity, and the medieval theologians were
 
spurted on by competition with their Moslem counterparts,
 
and by the evangelical imperative of their faith. To rely
 
upon Christian doctrine was an idle exercise in the face Of
 
Islam's own revealed truth, but if Christianity could be
 
shown to have the stronger logical base, conversion might be
 
possible. Copleston cites the De arte fidei catholicae. a
 
12th century work probably by Alan of Lille (but perhaps by
 
Nicolas of Amiens), as an example of an attempt to
 
rationalize Christianity. Alan's approach was to "exhibit
 
theology as a deductive science, based on self-evident
 
principles" (103). In doing so he was being self-

consciously Aristotelian. Ironically, Islam played the same
 
ace. Aristotle had a mighty influence on Islamic philosophy
 
of the same period. His works had been translated from
 
Greek into Syrian at schools in Mesopotamia, Persia and
 
Syria around the time of Boethius, and into Arabic in the
 
8th century. Thus Aristotle was available to Islamic
 
thinkers from Mohammed's time onward. At least two major
 
works by Plotinus and PrOclus were erroneously attributed to
 
Aristotle by the Arab translators, giving a curious
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Neo-Platonic flavor to the "Aristotle" studied in Arabia.
 
Nevertheless, for several centuries, "... scientific studies
 
flourished in the Islamic world at a time when such Studies
 
in the Christian West were in a much more rudimentary state"
 
(107). Spanish-born Ibn-Rushd (11267-1198?), known as
 
Averroes to the Christian world, "looked on Aristotle's
 
genius as the culmination of human intellectual activity"
 
(118). Jewish philosophy of the period was influenced by
 
the Greeks as well, with Aristotle gradually eclipsing Plato
 
as the strongest light. Copleston identifies MaimonideS
 
(1135-1204) as the foremost Jewish philosopher of the Middle
 
Ages. Born in the same city (Cordoba) as Averroes at about
 
the same time, Maimonides, in proving the existence of God,
 
used Aristotelian arguments.; Christian, Islamic and Jewish
 
philosophers worked, of course, from different premises, but
 
shared their approach of borrowing from logic to prove
 
religious truths. Logic did not die during the Middle Ages;
 
it shuffled through the period as the servant of theology.
 
Aristotle's stature continued to grow as more of his
 
literary corpus became known through Moslem sources,* he was
 
now The Philosopher. Aristotelian logic in Christian Europe
 
expanded to accommodate those books of the Oraanon that were
 
not available to Boethius. Rog;er Bacon in England and Ramon
 
Lull in Spain represent two directions within the Franciscan
 
order as the "new" logic was digested. The former became
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interested in empirical approaches tp science and advocated
 
experimental confirmation of scientific truth reached
 
through reason. Lull, devoting his long life to the
 
conversion of Moslems, made advances in logic that were
 
obscured over the years by the fact that he wrote mostly in
 
Arabic and Catalun. He used letters to represent terms and
 
concepts, and described "mechanical devices, with concentric
 
and rotating circles or discs, which would enable people to
 
see the various possible combinations of the basic [logical]
 
concepts" (174). This sounds like the circle diagrams of
 
modern logic texts. Copleston goes on to chronicle the
 
contributions of Acquinas, Duns Scotus and William of
 
Ockham, among others, but from the perspective of today,
 
medieval philosophers added little to pure logical theory,
 
although the use they made of what they had inherited could
 
often be dazzling.
 
Why mention medieval logic at all? One answer is
 
implicit in Copleston's description of Duns Scotus, whom he
 
clearly admires. It concerns particularly the idea of
 
scholasticism. As Copleston notes, we tend to think of the
 
medievals as "dealing with arid abstractions and developing
 
closely reasoned but involved logical arguments, subtle no
 
doubt but pedantic ... redolent of the academic world of
 
classrooms and formal disputations" (213). In a way, this
 
image of monks quarreling over pin-dancing angels does for
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us, by accident, what Zeno was trying to do for his
 
contemporaries a century before Aristotle. It debunks
 
reason. It ridicules logic. It works against the
 
acceptance of logic by today's secular society. The
 
proportion of people who hold Christian beliefs as revealed
 
first principles has dwindled to a small percentage in the
 
nominally Christian countries of the West, including the
 
United States. Not sharing the first premises of theology,
 
we find naive or irrelevant the conclusions to which logic
 
directed the medievals, and therefore suspect the process
 
that got them there. Science is the primary model of our
 
world view. We trust science, even when we don't understand
 
it, as the medievals did God. We don't trust logic,
 
especially the formal Aristotelian kind. It has a heavy,
 
antiquarian feel to it. Alternatively, it's a game like
 
chess, fun perhaps for those who have the patience for it,
 
but not relevant to our lives. To many, formal logic seems
 
both heavy and frivolous, difficult but not worth the
 
bother. Our association of it with medieval scholasticism
 
contributes to this reaction. We may see in the etymology
 
of the word trivial the low value we have come to place on
 
the subjects of the triyium. I
 
We think of the Renaissance as a re-birth of classical
 
learning, but this view doesn't apply well to logic. As we
 
have seen, the entirety of the Organon was available to the
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 late medieval thinkers, who tended to elevate Aristotle to a
 
high pedestal as the pure embodiment of pre-Christian
 
philosophy. The Renaissance took him down a few pegs,
 
especially outside Italy and among those interested in
 
practicing, or at least philosophizing about, science.
 
Francis Bacon, for example, thought he saw the fallacies
 
which had led medieval thinkers astray. Specifically, he
 
distrusted human perception, questioned our tendency to
 
generalize from our own quirky experience and education,
 
recognized the instability of language; and inyeighed
 
against the deference paid to very did and very dead
 
philosophers. Aristotle, for instance. Bacon's advocacy of
 
experimental science based on his inductive method helped
 
kick off the scientific revolution. AS Minard asserts,
 
Francis Bacon was more of a linguist and rhetorician than a
 
scientist and logician, but his influence on science was 
; ' • ■ ■ ' ■ ' ■ ^ ■ ' ■ " ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ; ■ ' ■■ , ■' : 
substantial. Eiseley contends that Bacon forced a
 
backward-looking Renaissance England "to swallow,
 
figuratively, a pill--the pill of science ..." (Eiseley 20).
 
Bacon also helped assure that Aristotle would be
 
associated more with formal logic than with the scientific
 
method. As the natural sciences (and later, the social
 
sciences) expanded, they appropriated inductive reasoning
 
for themselyes; leaving to logic only deductive reasoning.
 
The latter makes the more powerful claim--that its
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conclusions follow with certainty from true premises.
 
Inductive reasoning claims only near-certainty, or
 
probability. But induction, neglected while theology ruled
 
philosophy, opened up new methods for the budding natural
 
sciences. The science of Newton and Descarte supplanted
 
logic and metaphysical speculation as ways of making
 
knowledge. Academic departments based on induction
 
multiplied; logic and philosophy shrank. As the inventor of
 
formal logic, Aristotle lost stature. This was somewhat
 
unfair to Aristotle, whose own science was more inductive
 
than deductive. Tme, he made claims for logic that seem
 
absurd in a scientific context. He thought that a
 
scientific discovery is verified when it can be made the
 
conclusion of a syllogism, or series of syllogisms. Ackrill
 
allows that "the notion that scientists occupy themselves in
 
expounding demonstrative syllogisms based on definitions is
 
indeed laughable" (98). Ackrill goes on, though, to suggest
 
that in describing a science of demonstrative syllogisms,
 
Aristotle was not advocating a practical method, but
 
depicting an ideal or "finished" science. There hovers over
 
Ackrill's discussion of Aristotelian science the cloud of a
 
great historical misunderstanding, resulting in an
 
"Aristotelianism" that distorted the totality of the great
 
man's thinking. Bacon sought to break the grip that "the
 
sterile logic of the Aristotelian school men" had on his
 
33
 
conteTriporaries lEiseiey 35)v Mo scholarship has
 
rehabilitated Adristotle who, it is noted, with his helpers
 
collected and analyzed all the natural stuff they could get
 
their hands on, classifying nature according to observed
 
characteristics. But the perception of his science as
 
absurdly theoretical persists.
 
So the paradigm shifted gradually from Christianity and 
a disembodied Aristotelianism to the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment and the empiricism of modern science, leaving 
Aristotle momentarily behind. But the scientific revolution 
left open some of the questions it had raised. What, for 
example, was the true relationship between deduction and 
induction? The working out of this question must 
necessarily re-involve Aristotle, whose science contained 
elements of both. ■ An epic attempt at synthesis was 
performed by John Stuart Mill in 19th century England. His 
Logic comprised six books and underwent many revisions and 
eight publications during his lifetime (August 95). Part of 
Mill's genius lay in the ability to find disarmingly simple 
solutions to old questions. He pointed out that even 
deductive syllogisms arrive at their first (major) premises 
inductively. The premise "all men are mortal" is not a 
deduction, but an inference that rests upon millions of 
cases. Mill ".. . established a working relationship between 
the two kinds of logic" (August 98). The vindication of 
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Aristotle inscribed in Mill's solution is also contained in
 
the quotation from Einstein with which August prefaces the
 
chapter on Mill's logic: "The supreme task of the physicist
 
is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which
 
the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction" (August 89).
 
Modern science relies upon induction rather than naus
 
(intuitive reason) to establish first premises, but often
 
proceeds deductively towards its conclusions. Naus and
 
induction are, it seems to me, related psychologically.
 
Naus is probably guesswork informed by experience. Bacon's
 
breakthrough would seem to be his attempt to systematize
 
naus. After him, scientists replaced guesswork with a
 
developing system based on induction and probability, which
 
are now thought to dominate the research methods of the
 
natural and social sciences.
 
To take it further. Mill describes the method by which
 
hypotheses are generated and tested experimentally as a
 
syllogism with induction supplying one or more of the terms.
 
We may see the truth in Mill's formulation by considering
 
Millikan's oil drop experiment, which established the
 
existence of the elementary unit of electrical charge and
 
won the 1923 Nobel prize for physics. The experiment was
 
the major premise of a syllogism whose middle term might be
 
expressed in this way: particles sprayed through an
 
electronically charged field will fly randomly if there is
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no elementary charge, but in a pattern if such a unit
 
exists. The conclusion of the syllogism, that; a unit does
 
or does not exist, cannot be deductively certain, since the
 
first premise is empirical obserya:tibn bf: a cohtrived^
 
experiment, and the second is a theQtetical hypothesis. But
 
if the hypothesis makes sense and the experiment
 
operationalizes the question in a manner thah^^^^r^^ out all
 
other explanations and achieves replicable results, then the
 
conclusion may be accepted as true. The breakthrough
 
concept is the middle term, the link between observation and
 
new knowledge. This framing of the scientific method
 
recalls Aristotle's conviction that science, in its pure
 
form, is a search for the elusive middle term (Posterior
 
Analytics II.2.89b36; see Ackrill 100). What Aristotle
 
began to suspect about the connection between deduction and
 
induction. Mill made explicit, and science confirmed.
 
: : Up to the time of Mill, formal (deductive) logic had
 
advanced but little after Aristotle. Ackrill quotes Kant as
 
having said that "... since Aristotle, [logic] has not
 
required to retrace a single step ... to the present day
 
this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and
 
is thus to all appearances a closed and completed body of
 
doctrine" (Ackrill 81). That was in 1787. The relationship
 
between logic and mathematics, remarked on earlier, is
 
visible in the contributions made by mathematicians to
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formal logic in the 19th and 20th centuries. Editor William
 
Bartley introduces Lewis Carroll's Symbolic Logic by
 
dividing formal logic into three historical periods. The
 
Aristotelian period spanned more than two millennia, with
 
scant change. Bartley fixes the Boolean or transitional
 
period from 1847 into the early 20th century. George Boole,
 
a contemporary of Mill, got deductive logic moving again
 
with a system of symbolic logic modeled on algebra, with
 
applications that reached beyond logic to science and
 
engineering. (Electronic calculators use principles of
 
Boolean algebra to perform arithmetic functions.) Carroll
 
himself was a math professor who devoted much of his last
 
years to the project of making logic fun and accessible to
 
the masses. The logicians of the transitional period did
 
not abandon the syllogism, but put it in a new and reduced
 
perspective. Their task was no longer to validate a line of
 
reasoning by reducing it to a syllogism or series of
 
syllogisms, but to find the logic inherent in a given set of
 
premises or conditions (Carroll 15-23).
 
The third period began with Bertrand Russell's The
 
Principles of Mathematics (1903). This book, along with
 
Russell's later collaborations with Alfred North Whitehead,
 
sought to demonstrate the unity of mathematics and logic.
 
We grasp intuitively that math is "logical"; Russell
 
attempted to show that from the principles of formal logic.
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it is possible to deduce the fundamental principles of math.
 
In the process, he developed a "propositional calculus" that
 
extended formal logic beyond the range of nearly everyone
 
not already defeated by the syllogism or by Boole's algebra.
 
Building on the work of Russell, and heavily influenced by
 
the British empiricists, notably Hume, the logical
 
positivists then took the extreme position that no
 
proposition is meaningful unless it is subject to empirical
 
verification. Logical positivism banished metaphysical
 
speculation from philosophy, along with ethics and
 
aesthetics, in so far as judgments cannot be verified by the
 
senses. Under Ayer, "philosophy is a department of logic"
 
(Ayer, Lancruaae. 57).
 
Logical positivism was attacked from many sides.
 
George Saritayaha's metaphor for Russell expressed the
 
humanist objection to the new logic: "Russell's eye is
 
mobile and accurate. It sweeps the universe like an
 
intensely concentrated searchlight, but it sees only a small
 
patch at a time ... (absorbed with) the absolutely obvious
 
and logically certain" (Santayana, Birth, 127). Durant
 
averred that the logic of Russell and Whitehead "was as
 
completely divorced as possible from all experience ..."
 
(Durant. Mansions. 29). Karl Popper whimsically took
 
personal credit for killing logical positivism (Schilpp,
 
Popper. 69). Popper wanted to extinguish the growing
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preoccupation of philosophy with linguistic precision, but
 
the dominance of linguistic issues over contempqrary
 
philosophy, traceable to the logical positivists, shows that
 
he was not successful. But philosophy^ still
 
teach ethics, aesthetics and Hegel. There seems to be a
 
general sense that logical positivism has made its
 
contributions and run its course.
 
Of the generation we're now discussing, John Dewey had
 
the greatest direct impact on American education. American
 
pragmatism had obvious roots in British empiricism, but the
 
key test of a proposition for Dewey was not whether it could
 
be verified, but whether it worked. Dewey thought practicai
 
logic to be a general, intuitive human attribute, like
 
speech, and that experience would show what principles and
 
orders of relations were valid within a given subject. ^
 
referred to a "natural selection" by which different logical
 
approaches would compete to meet the test of expediehcy.
 
The example of jurisprudence served to illustrate the
 
problem of applying logic to human affairs. He quoted with
 
approbation Justice Holmes: "... the whole outline of the V
 
law is the resultant of a conflict at every point between
 
logic and good sense--the one striving to wOrk fiction out
 
to consistent results, the other restraining arid at last
 
overcoming that effort when the results become too
 
manifestly unjust" (Dewey 130). Better to try each case on
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its merits and invoke logic retroactively to justify the
 
outcome. The Pragmatists anticipated logical positivism in
 
the emphasis on experience and distrust of metaphysics, but
 
logic for Dewey was not the unifying principle of his
 
philosophy. Let's find out what works, he urged, and let
 
the British worry about consistency.
 
The fragmented state of logic that we observe in
 
American education may be said to represent a victory of
 
pragmatism over logical positivism. This is ironic because
 
the logical positivists didn't direct their main attack
 
against pragmatism, but rather against anything that smacked
 
of metaphysics. In this fight Dewey and the Vienna Circle
 
were distant allies. Both preferred common sense to
 
abstract speculation, induction to deduction. Logical
 
positivism, had it prevailed, might have been able to
 
restore to higher education a unifying center to replace
 
rhetoric, which had enjoyed a central position in the
 
American university through most of the 19th century. As
 
departments of rhetoric were replaced by departments of
 
English and communications, and the common core of rhetoric
 
and the classics by the new elective curriculum,
 
undergraduate education lost its center. The logical
 
positivists sought to elevate a unified and sophisticated
 
logic to the position once held by rhetoric, in the process
 
restoring a degree of unity. But the centrifugal power of
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pragmatism proved too great. The "whatever works" approach
 
freed each new department to discover its own "logic," its
 
own rules for making knowledge. Also, the relativist bias
 
of our age is as hostile to the idea of logic as it is
 
sympathetic to pragmatism. In any event, the appeal of
 
pragmatism slowly exploded the notion of a unifying logic.
 
The shards from this explosion lie scattered throughout
 
the academy. Formal or deductive logic is sometimes still
 
said to be the property of philosophy departments, while
 
induction belongs to the natural and social sciences. But
 
after Mill, this formulation is conceptually obsolete.
 
"Formal logic" has also come to mean exalted academic logic,
 
both deductive and inductive, as distinct from informal
 
logic, the practical kind that gets the hay down to where
 
most of us goats can get it. Informal logic is what the
 
Greeks meant by locros before Aristotle came along. We
 
encounter it today in writing classes, critical thinking
 
classes, speech and debate, and indeed, in logic courses,
 
where the textbooks of such "informal" logicians as Toulmin,
 
Quine, Beardsley and Kahane have largely supplanted the
 
study of formal logic. Psychology, as it investigates
 
cognition, attempts to account for logical ways of thinking.
 
Natural sciences teach the scientific method; social
 
sciences, research design and statistics; and math
 
departments, advanced probability theory. Logic is
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everywhere in academia. However, only students who take
 
upper-division courses in logic from vestigial philosophy
 
departments are likely to be taught the subject in h
 
systematic way. Most American students know a little of
 
Aristotle, but of the syllogism, perhaps only BARBARA. Each
 
discipline teaches that portion of logic that it deems
 
necessary for its own purposes. Regarding the task of
 
assembling the fragments into a coherent whole, today's
 
students are, to an extent I find distressing, on their own.
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Despite the close kinship between logic and rhetoric,
 
we cannot accurately say that they followed parallel courses
 
in the evolution of American education True, the influence
 
of British thinkers dominated American practice until well
 
into the 19th century for rhetoric, and well into the 20th
 
for logic. But aside from the British connection, the two
 
disciplines moved on separate tracks, only occasionally
 
crossing each other at stations along the way. As we have
 
seen, after two millennia of stasis, logic grew
 
exponentially from the time of Mill and Boole. The competing
 
claims of deduction and induction were reconciled, new
 
avenues of inquiry were opened up, and a relatively small
 
number of obsessed geniuses, led by Russell and Whitehead,
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built up the struGture of contemporary logic. By
 
comparison, the history of rhetoric is a mess, a cacophony
 
of many voices, a mad attic of swinging pendulums and
 
revolving carousels, a twisted skein of theory and practice
 
whose varied threads are truncated only to appear again,
 
decades later, intertwined with other threads in new
 
combinations.
 
This discrepancy between the recent histories of
 
rhetoric and logic is predictable and healthy. Logic is a
 
permanent, pre-existing system of relations that awaits
 
discovery, or so logicians might have it; one would expect
 
its development to be cumulative, like math. Rhetoric,
 
according to the very oldest and the very newest theory, is
 
transactional, a negotiation of meaning achieved by the
 
interplay of rhetor, audience, object (subject matter), and
 
language, to be used in areas where logic or science or
 
sensual experience are unable to determine truth. Aristotle
 
thought the domain of rhetoric to be the public arena of
 
law, politics, and similar situations where persuasion is
 
called for, but proof not possible. For some, the domain of
 
rhetoric is much greater. There is a new transactional
 
rhetoric, which Berlin identifies as "epistemic," that
 
"exists not merely so that truth may be communicated [but]
 
so that truth may be discovered." Since "knowledge itself
 
is a rhetorical construct" (Berlin, 20th. 165), the domain
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of rhetoric is all-inclusive. On the other extreme, social
 
scientists who attempt to employ the methods of natural
 
science, math and logic to human relations may operate from
 
epistemological assumptidns more positivistic than
 
Aristotle's, and would narrow the terrain that rhetoric is
 
free to negotiate. As Berlin points out, the variable here
 
appears to be epistemology. As he puts it, "Every
 
rhetoric...is grounded in a noetic field: a closed system
 
defining what can, and cannot, be known; the nature of the
 
knower; the nature Of the relationship between the knower,
 
the known, and the audience; and the nature of language"
 
(19th. 2). Berlin goes on to acknowledge that in a
 
pluralistic democracy as large as the United States, it is
 
unlikely that one noetic field, or one rhetoric, will
 
dominate (although one rhetoric, the "current-traditional"
 
one, dominated college writing instruction fob nearly a
 
century, and still informs the practice of most [according
 
to Berlin; I would say "many"] English teachers in American
 
secondary schools). There has been no American rhetoric,
 
bnt bather, many American rhetorics, which have varied
 
hugely in the treatment and importance given to logic.
 
Berlin uses two different but related taxonomies to
 
help unravel the skein, one for the 19th century and one for
 
the 20th. His two-volume overview does not discuss the
 
details of how logic has been incorporated into American
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writing iristruction, but is informed by a tritical reading
 
of dozens of rlietdninal tfeatises and textbboks> His
 
taxonomies and comments are thus pertinent to our discussion
 
of logic. American departments of rhetoric lagged their
 
British cbuntetparts by several deca.des, so that as Berlin
 
picks up the story at the end of the Revolution, the
 
classical rhetoric that prevailed in America gave;way the
 
19th century to a psychological or "18th Century" rhetoric
 
based on Scottish Common Sense Realism (hereafter SCSR). To
 
summarize: Classical rhetoric, descending from Aristotle,
 
Cicero and Quintilian, occupied the central position in
 
American higher education at the time of the Revolution. It
 
was a time-honored, comprehensive system that accounted for
 
every step of the composing process. It had a rational base
 
in the deductive logic of Aristotle, but valued emotional
 
and ethical persuasion in their proper spheres, and
 
accommodated the audience, in that the task of the rhetor
 
was to find the available means of persuasion according to
 
the sophistication of the audience, its receptiveness to the
 
rhetor's message, etc. John Quincy Adams, ensconced in the
 
Boylston Chair of Rhetoric at Harvard for a few years in
 
between stints as legislator and diplomat, assembled his
 
lectures into an elegant statement of the classical ,
 
position. Published in 1810 to the utter indifference of
 
the civilized world. Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratorv
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presented "nine lectures on inyention, eight on arrangement,
 
ten on style, one on delivery, and even one on memory"
 
(Berlin, 19th, 15). The rational basis of Adams' rhetoric
 
is clearly stated, as is its affinity to the separate
 
discipline of logic: "VThe connexion between genuine
 
rhetoric and sound logic is indeed indissoluble. All good
 
speaking must necessarily rest upon the basis of accurate
 
thinkingi' He goes on to argue that logic and rhetoric must
 
be separated, but that they are closely related: ''logic to
 
the Operations of the mind, within itself; rhetoric to the
 
communication of their results to the minds of others.' in
 
this view, 'logic is the store house, from which the
 
instruments Of rhetoric are to be drawn'" (19th. 16).
 
Berlin finds much to admire in the classical approach,
 
including the observation that its professors were dedicated
 
to the teaching of undergraduates. But Lectures was already
 
obsolete by the time it was published.
 
In explaining the demise of classical rhetoric, Berlin
 
notes that its association with England tended to discredit
 
it in post-revolutionary America, which was struggling to
 
establish a system of education, not to mention a
 
literature, that was suited to and reflective of the
 
American experience. But it was more than that. Adams'
 
rhetoric suffered, unjustly, from the association with
 
Aristotle, and here we see an American replication of the
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"great historical misunderstanding" alluded to above in
 
connection with Francis Bacon and the Enlightenment thinkers
 
who followed, 19th Centu^^y America conducted the same
 
rebellion against deductive reasoning and in favor of
 
induction that the British empiricists had a century-

earlier. "And in overthrowing Aristotelian logic, the age
 
discarded Aristotelian rhetoric as well, if only for its
 
association with the deductive method" (l£th, 17). George
 
Campbell, one of the architects of the "18th century
 
rhetoric" that defined American rhetoric in the 19th
 
century, went so far as to deny the validity of deductive
 
reasoning in either logic b^r rhetoric. This anti-Aristotle
 
bias may have had political motives. Aristotelian rhetoric,
 
in so fat as it does privilege deductive reasoning, is
 
inherently conservative, since it proceeds from existing
 
knowledge to find new truth, rather than relying upon
 
empirical observation, which might refute existing knowledge
 
altogether. Glassicalrhetdtic's association with the
 
aristocratic English university made it politically
 
incorrect in the age of expanding American democracy.
 
Adams' rhetoric drowned in the same rising tide that swamped
 
the sixth president himself in the election of 1828, the
 
"Jackson" in this case being the rhetoric of Campbell, Hugh
 
Blair and Richard Whately.
 
These three propdnents of SCSR dominated American
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rhetpric up to the Civil War, when their American disciples,
 
such as Samuel P. Newman and Henry Day, took over. Newman
 
followed the belletristic approach of Blair; Day built upon
 
the "faculty psychology" of SCSR, following Campbell. Each
 
of these authors differed from the others on some points,
 
and spawned proteges who also had their differences. But in
 
broad outline, as Berlin schemes it out, these "18th
 
century" rhetoricians produced a mechanistic and reductive
 
rhetoric whose direct descendent, the "current-traditional"
 
rhetoric, held sway until the 1960's. Berlin doesn't mention
 
Boole, but we may note that 18th Century rhetoric was not
 
informed by the new Boolean logic, which developed
 
independently of current rhetorical theory. Logic and
 
rhetoric, so closely united in Adams' work, were now split
 
apart, and remain split to this day.
 
In what ways were these 18th century rhetorics
 
"reductive"? Although based on the probable conclusions of
 
induction, their proponents entertained a markedly
 
positivistic epistemology derived from SCSR and its "faculty
 
psychology." SCSR posited two corresponding realities, the
 
material and the spiritual. Human beings are born with
 
certain "faculties" that enable us to perceive truth in both
 
of these areas, if we open up our faculties to receive it.
 
It's up to the individual to seek truth by developing and
 
freeing the intellect, reason, intuition, etc., in an
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environment uncontaminated by the mediation of other
 
thinkers. This done, the seeker may become rhetor by so
 
arranging his speech or writing as to re-create the truth in
 
the minds of listeners or readers. This rhetoric tends to
 
factor out the social context. Since truth is apprehended
 
first by the rhetor, he knows what he wants to say, and so
 
invention disappears from rhetoric, or takes on a new
 
definition, namely arrangement. Truth is not negotiated or
 
transacted, but conveyed. The rhetor adapts his message to
 
his audience, which remains a passive recipient. 18th
 
century rhetoric elevated speech above writing, because
 
speech engages more faculties in both sender and receiver.
 
In this, it anticipated the romantic rhetoric of Emerson.
 
Nineteenth century America was not yet democratic, and
 
neither was its rhetoric. The American university at
 
mid-century was administered mostly by clerics and served,
 
mostly, the aristocracy. However, after the Civil War, a
 
radically changed economy, an emerging middle class with
 
college aspirations for its children, and the spread of free
 
public education through high school, together with other
 
forces nearly as wrenching, wrought great changes within the
 
academy. It would not be unreasonable to expect, under such
 
conditions, a major paradigm shift in rhetoric. The third
 
category in Berlin's 19th century taxonomy, romantic
 
rhetoric, would have accomplished such a shift, had it
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succeeded. Based on the speech and writing of Emerson and
 
other Transcendentalists, "romantic rhetoric" may strike us
 
at first as an oxymoron: since Romanticism glorified the
 
individual and the need for self-expression, of what use is
 
the art of persuasion? Indeed, one common interpretation of
 
Emerson is that his individualism and preoccupation with
 
spiritual reality, or the "oyersoul," precluded him from
 
considering a transactional rhetoric. A rhetoric based on
 
this interpretation would be Platonic rather than
 
Aristotelian, and would lead to a composition pedagogy that
 
emphasizes the removal of barriers to self-expression. As
 
with "18th century" rhetoric, the role of the audience as a
 
partner in the making of knowledge disappears. The
 
difference is that the focus shifts not to transmission of
 
effect, but to the authenticity of the rhetor's voice.
 
Recent composition textbooks by Macrorie, Coles, Stewart and
 
others have worked this "rhetorical vein" (Berlin, 19th,
 
45). But there is a different reading of Emerson that
 
produces a much more comprehensive rhetoric. Emerson,
 
although he sought a faculty chair in rhetoric, never
 
compiled his thoughts on rhetoric into a single treatise on
 
the subject, and his writings allow for conflicting
 
interpretations. But remembering his dictum on foolish
 
consistency, we may extract from Emerson a comprehensive
 
rhetoric tailored to the needs of emerging American
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fiirierson idealist in love with self-reliance, and
 
one of his ongoing concerns was the recohciliaticn of
 
philosbphical idealism with democratic politics.
 
Transcendentaiism shared with SGSR the dualism of material
 
and spiritual reality, :But under Emerson; the dour
 
Presbyterian outlook of SCSR became an enthusiastic love of
 
nature. The external world was sacred for Emerson not just
 
because God created it, but because its reality corresponded
 
in some organic way to a higher spiritual realm, so that
 
understanding nature is a pathway to understanding the
 
divine. Since language is grounded in the external world,
 
it may express through metaphor the deep, transcendent truth
 
that makes the rhetor valuable and necessary especially in a
 
democracy. Emerson's rhetoric derived its energy from the
 
value that democracy places upon resolving problems by
 
discussion and debate. In America, rhetoric mattered, and
 
every citizen should be motivated to hone his rhetorical
 
skills to the level of eloquence:
 
If there ever was a country where eloquence was a
 
power, it is the United States. Here is room for
 
every degree of it, on every one of its ascending
 
stages...Is it not worth the ambition of every
 
generous youth to train and arm his mind with all
 
the resources of knowledge, of method, of grace and
 
of character, to serve such a constituency (20th.
 
Metaphor is no mere embellishment nor, as with Plato, the
 
"exceptional province of the philosopher" (48). It is the
 
universal language of truth. Nor should the orator's
 
diction and syntax be confined to polite speech. Rather, he
 
"must command the whole scale of hhe language, from the most
 
elegant to the most low and vile" (52). Emerson's
 
democratic rhetoric made the common man into a poet, and the
 
elite orator into a verbal street fighter.
 
Here was a rhetoric for an emerging democracy. But in
 
spite of Emerson's popularity, his rhetoric never quite took
 
hold. Composition textbooks informed by Emersonian rhetoric
 
did appear later in the century. Fred Newton Scott, a
 
colleague of John Dewey who was himself an admirer of
 
Emerson, published (along with Joseph Villiers Denney and
 
Gertrude Buck) a series of textbooks that presented an
 
alternative to prevailing practice. But romantic rhetoric
 
lost out to the "current-traditional" school. Berlin locates
 
the reason for this in the politics of the academy and of
 
the larger society in which it nested. The egalitarian
 
strain in American culture did not yet prevail over the
 
totalitarian. Emerging democracy aside, America was still a
 
top-down society. By choosing a sender-receiver model of
 
rhetoric over a self-expressive one (and passing Emerson
 
over for the elusive professorship of rhetoric), college
 
administrators were responding to a market demand for
 
communication and correctness--for graduates who could
 
function in a corporate environment. After all, in spite of
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being endowed with an egalitarian political theory and
 
entrusted by history with the chalice of democracy, America
 
has remained a conservative society through most of its
 
history- America was not "ready" for Emerson in the 19th
 
century, and may not yet be. The fate of romantic rhetoric
 
may be seen as a demonstration that America's love affairs
 
with its radical thinkers tend not to be consummated by
 
permanent union.
 
The various nineteenth century rhetorics that replaced
 
the classical assigned a low value to deductive logic.
 
Eighteenth century rhetoric explicitly set itself in
 
opposition to Aristotle. Emerson glorified reason, but it
 
was an instinctive reason grounded in metaphor rather than
 
logic. Moreover, as the century waned, the college
 
curriculum changed in:ways tldiat were hostile to both logic
 
and rhetoric- Under the new elective system pioneered at
 
Harvard, the required course in rhetoric shrank from three
 
years to One, and there; was considerable pressure around the
 
turn of the century to eliminate the freshman rhetoric /
 
course entirely. The new English departments made literary
 
studies their new centerpiece, relegating rhetoric, once the
 
heart of the under-grad-uate curriculum, to low-status drudge
 
work. Logic lost prestige along with rhetoric, so that the
 
proportion of students who actually studied logic decreased
 
during the era of logic's greatest growth since the death of
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Aristotle.
 
For the 20th century, Berlin employs a new
 
three-slotted taxonomy; rhetorics are seen to be objective,
 
subjective or transactional, according to the underlying
 
epistemology. Objective theories include most notably the
 
"current-traditional" rhetoric, whose most influential
 
proponents at the turn of the century were A.S. Hill and
 
Barrett Wendell of Harvard, and John Genung of Amherst. In
 
the letter's hands, rhetorical study "abandoned concern for
 
the ethical as it became completely positivistic in intent."
 
The composition taught in classes guided by this rhetoric
 
tended to focus on discourse "conceived exclusively in
 
empirical and rational teinns" (Berlin, 20th, 8). Emotional,
 
ethical and aesthetic considerations were subordinated to
 
unity and correctness and precision of language. JoAnn
 
Campbell's review of English A at Radcliffe finds the old
 
professors to have been afraid of intimacy and the objects
 
of frustrated covert criticism by some of their students:
 
"Wendell conceived of the classroom as a combative arena and
 
believed that an important element of education--vigorous
 
contest--disappeared when women were taught alongside men"
 
(Campbell 478). This was rhetoric in the service of
 
science, men's work, and it clearly anticipated logical
 
positivism.
 
The logic employed by current-traditional teachers was
 
54
 
almost always the informal kind. The propositional calculus
 
being deyeloped by Russell and Whitehead and their followers
 
was too large and abstruse to be mentioned in a composition
 
class, and because of specialization and the elective
 
curriculum alluded to earlier, few Composition teachers
 
would have been qualified to teach it. By mid-century,
 
those few philosophers and mathematicians who were doing
 
original work in formal logic labored in relative isolation
 
from scholars of rhetoric. By 1949, when two famous New
 
Critics at the peak of their careers collaborated to
 
describe the existing state of rhetoric, practically no one
 
advocated teaching formal logic along with rhetoric. Brooks
 
and Warren voiced confidence that the student need not
 
burden himself with formal logic: "...to learn to think
 
straight is the aim of your education..." (Brooks and Warren
 
1). "As for logical thinking," you already use it in
 
everyday life; you need merely "to apply it to the subject
 
at hand..." (8). Nevertheless, to develop the "it," the
 
authors included sub-chapters on propositions, evidence,
 
induction, deduction, fallacies, and implied syllogisms.
 
The 928-page Modern Rhetoric was heavily weighted toward
 
analysis of selected passages, models and readings.
 
Composition could not reach up into the ratified world of
 
the new theoretical logic, and didn't feel the need of doing
 
SO; but the rational, positivistic, analytical basis of
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current-traditional rhetoric is present as Berlin describes
 
•it.
 
Berlin brings the semanticist S.I. Hayakawa into the
 
objectivist tent. I'm not sure he belongs there. His
 
Language in Thoucfht and Action is in part a semantical
 
critique of formal logic. "The belief that logic will
 
substantially reduce misunderstanding is widely and
 
uncritically held," he asserts (241). But logic only works
 
within communities of discourse whose members not only share
 
a common language, but are able as well to "police" it. He
 
finds Aristotle outdated and recommends against "the
 
assiduous study and practice of traditional, two-valued
 
logic..." (241). Thus the conservative wire-puller would
 
pull the plug on Aristotle and traditional logic.
 
Furthermore, his critique of "two-valued" logic--meaning a
 
logic that allows only dualities Of right-wrong or
 
true-false, as opposed to gradations of rightness or
 
truth--might be construed as anti-positivist. That said,
 
Hayakawa perhaps displays enough zealous confidence in the
 
explanatory power of semantics to qualify as a positivist,
 
though hot a logical one. So he shares tent space after all
 
with the current-traditionalists, and also with purveyors of
 
rhetoric based on structural linguistics and behavioral
 
psychology.
 
Berlin cites several historical examples of.subjective
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 rhetoric> fro through Emerson andThoreau, past the
 
rhetoric of "liberal culture" and down to Rogers and Maslow.
 
Subjective rhetoric "locates truth either within the
 
individual or within a realm that is accessible only to the
 
individual's internal apprehension " (Berlin, 20th, 11).
 
Composition pedagogy based on such a rhetoric typically
 
searches for original metaphor, fosters autobiographical
 
writing, emphasizes such practices as journal writing,
 
freewriting and peer-editing groups, and seeks to cultivate
 
the unique voice and vision of the individual student. The
 
teacher becomes less of an authority and more of a
 
CO-learner. Practioners of the art of subjective rhetoric
 
tend to be explicitly hostile to logic if they mention it at
 
all, and it's easy to see why. Their theoretical
 
orientation views students as possessing the innate ability
 
to write, but lacking the confidence. Students have been
 
discouraged by their experience in school from believing
 
that they can write, or they write so fearfully and
 
carefully that their creativity is stifled. The solution
 
for such writers is not to impose tests of logical validity
 
on their writing, which would only inhibit them more, but to
 
remove such blocks, thereby freeing the subconscious mind,
 
accessing existing knowledge, and allowing the writer's
 
individual voice to resonate on the printed page. Such a
 
pedagogy must value the subconscious "logic" of associations
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and feelings over the artificial logic of terms and
 
propositions. Echoing Bacon's dismissal of Aristotle, such
 
teachers often refer to logic as sterile, or even
 
oppressive. If logic fits at all into the processes of
 
subjective rhetoric, it is late in the revision stage, after
 
the fact of inspiration, when it is time to bring coherence
 
to the nearly finished product. Logical thinking as a habit
 
of mind is seen as an impediment to writing in the student,
 
and in the teacher, a source of intimidation that he should
 
consciously suppress in the classroom.
 
The most eloquent defense I've seen of subjective
 
rhetoric is Elbow's Writing Without Teachers. To this short
 
primer on "teacherless writing" the author appends an essay
 
meant to justify his methods to a skeptical academy. In it.
 
Elbow distinguishes between the "doubting game" and the
 
"believing game." Starting with the quote from Alice about
 
believing impossible things. Elbow characterizes the
 
traditional academic enterprise as one of doubting, of
 
seeking truth by ferreting out error, of teaching writing by
 
pointing out faults. The "machinery of symbolic logic," he
 
notes, helps in the doubting game by factoring out the self
 
(Elbow 148). Elbow finds that the doubt induced by years of
 
formal education may ricochet back to the student, turning
 
into self-doubt and blocking the writing process. By
 
contrast, the believing game replaces doubt with a
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purposefully naive credulity. Elbow invokes Tertullian:
 
"Credo ut intelligam" (I believe in order to understand).
 
All assertions may be "believed," even absurd ones, in the
 
sense that the believer makes an earnest effort to
 
understand or postulate the people who make them. The
 
doubting game values logic and the dialectic of
 
propositions; the believing game, metaphor (remember
 
Emerson!) and the dialectic of experience. The one extracts
 
the self; the other re-inserts it.
 
Elbow is willing to risk absurdity for the reward of
 
tapping into the power of belief. But he does so with both
 
eyes open, and makes it clear that he still values the
 
doubting tradition of Socrates and Descartes. His thesis is
 
that the doubting game has held a monopoly over Western
 
culture for too long, and needs to move over and grant
 
legitimacy to the believihg game, so that the two may sit
 
side-by-side and reinforce each other. Logic does not die
 
under Elbow's regime, but its mechanical buzz is muffled
 
while Student voices are nurtured.
 
Is rhetoric complete when doubt and belief co-exist?
 
Berlin would say no, if it means that the grounds for
 
knowing remain confined to the objective and the subjective.
 
Berlin holds out for a transactional rhetoric "based on an
 
epistemology that sees truth as arising out of the
 
interaction of the elements of the rhetorical
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situation"--rhetor, objeGt, audience,: and language (20th.
 
15). Hesdistinguish^^ types of trahsactional
 
rhetoric. ;The first 6f, these, the Claissical, refers to the
 
Aristotelian tradition, a comprehensive body of thought that
 
regards noh-scientific knowledge as soCially-cQnstructed
 
phenomena, rather than as objective fact. In this ancient
 
formulation, science, math and logic deal with facts outside
 
the domain of rhetoric. Rhetoric takes over at the point
 
where fact cannot be established and agreed on. (But logic,
 
math and science may contribute to the rhetorical resolution
 
of disputes.) Complete and internally harmonious, classical
 
rhetoric underwent a revival in the 1960's with the
 
publication of Edward Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the
 
Modern Student and articles by Corbett, Hughes, Price,
 
Raymond and others. In the early 1960's, classical rhetoric
 
helped provide material for the emerging discipline of
 
composition studies, as opposed to the old one of rhetoric.
 
Stephen North fixes the birth of "modern Composition,
 
capital C" at 1963 (15). At that time, an educational
 
reform movement in English studies sought to replace the old
 
Dewey-inspired progressive education with more clearly
 
defined subject matter, and college composition teachers,
 
realizing that their subject consisted of some fifty years
 
of practitioner lore without a research base, or the rules
 
for making such a base, saw the necessity of assuming
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authority for scholarship in their field. Until such time
 
as the composition community could develop and pursue its
 
own research methodology, it had to make do with the
 
materials at hand. There in the closet was the same baggage
 
from antiquity that had been abandoned in Adams' time, and
 
again by the 20th century logicians. Corbett et al
 
gratefully rediscovered Aristotle, as some academic
 
community or other seems to do, once or twice per century.
 
Passing over "cognitive rhetoric," we see in Berlin's
 
embrace of "epistemic rhetoric" a quest for that Holy Grail
 
of academe--philosophic unity of the disciplines. If
 
consummated under the terms of the epistemics, one might
 
expect to see a further decline in the prestige of logic, at
 
least the formal kind. Epistemic rhetoric holds that all
 
knowledge-making, without exception, is rhetorical activity.
 
Physical science, math, logic itself, as well as the
 
"softer" human sciences, all must rely on rhetoric to create
 
meaning. Such a formulation would not only restore rhetoric
 
to the center of higher education, but would make it central
 
to each discipline. Seen in relation to the past, it is a
 
truly radical idea. Viewed in the context of modern
 
philosophical relativism, and the resulting unmet need to
 
have something absolute to hang one's intellectual hat on,
 
epistemic rhetoric becomes understandable, even "logical."
 
Here, the absolute is that there are no absolutes. All
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knowledge is subject to negotiation and re-negotiation.
 
Certainty is inherently suspect. Each community, each
 
discipline makes its own rules for making knowledge, as they
 
do now; but the rules and the knowledge they produce are
 
contingent, even in the "hardest" of sciences.
 
The advantages of such a world view to the academy are
 
obvious. It would help guard against false certainty,
 
against the closure of academic minds to new ways of looking
 
at things. It would encourage a proper sense of humility in
 
the face of humankind's imperfect ability to know. It would
 
foster habits of listening and attitudes of acceptance that
 
might, in spite of human nature, restore civility to
 
campuses split and frayed by the culture wars. And it would
 
make multi-culturalism easier for such campuses to digest.
 
New or dissenting groups could advance their agendas without
 
having to overcome the solidification into absolutes of
 
practices, procedures, theories and literary canons that
 
are, at the core, contingent and negotiable. Advocates of
 
epistemic rhetoric would in this light seem to be ahead of
 
the curve in campus politics.
 
Meanwhile, of course, informal logic and logic-based
 
modes of discourse have remained a part of the college
 
composition pedagogy. A survey of a dozen popular textbooks
 
bears this out. One worthy of mention because of its
 
emphasis on logic is Martin, Ohman and Wheatley's The Logic
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and Rhetoric of Composition. The book's unstated premises
 
are that the students of the era (the 1960's) needed help
 
with logical thinking, and that it was appropriate for the
 
composition teacher to supply it. Discursive in tone and
 
measured in pace, the book takes teacher and student on a
 
tour of the landscape of informal logic as it elicits
 
(hopefully) logical writing by exercises scattered through
 
the text. Logic-based chapters on explanation, speech acts,
 
proving and persuasion, containing some two dozen
 
sub-headings such as "The Uses of Definition," "The Limits
 
of Logic," and "The Ethics of Persuasion," precede sections
 
on style, diction and correctness. In that it implies
 
belief that students can and should learn discourse without
 
first having to master correctness, it is consistent with
 
later theorists, such as Shaughnessy. The chapter on proof
 
is interesting. In it the authors echo Brooks and Warren:
 
"Most educated people reason well enough for most purposes,
 
most of the time" (Martin et al. 85). Yet the first half of
 
the book is as much a primer on logic as a composition text.
 
Teachers who have the inclination and time to teach logic to
 
their composition students might find this text congenial.
 
Like many of the texts I reviewed, it squirms against
 
placement in Berlin's taxonomy. Current-traditional in its
 
emphasis on reason, it is transactional in its awareness of
 
the limits of logic and of the social context of
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knowledge-making.
 
Logic texts by Irving Copi, Monroe Beardsley and others
 
have influenced composition teachers and have even been used
 
in the composition classroom. Martin et al acknowledge a
 
debt to Beardsley, whose various editions of Thinking
 
Straiaht have been in wide use for decades. Of particular
 
interest to composition teachers are Beardsley's distinction
 
between rhetoric (does it convince) and logic (should it
 
convince); his rules of "grouping" and "direction" for
 
oirganizing evidence (see p.19); the tree diagram for
 
analyzing arguments,* and his introductory defense of
 
objective thinking. Copi's Introduction to Locfic (seven
 
editions from 1953 to 1986) defines logic in its rhetorical
 
context. W.V. Quihe's Methods of Logic, also cited by
 
Martin, emphasizes symbolic logic systems with only indirect
 
relevance to composition. Stephen Toulmin's writings have
 
also been influential. According to Fulkerson, Toulmin's
 
six-part model for informal logical analysis is incorporated
 
into some composition textbooks (although in isolation,* see
 
Fulkerson 445). Trimbur reports that the controversial
 
University of Texas program that stipulated a political
 
Content for all sections of freshman composition also
 
stipulated the teaching of Toulmin's concepts of claims and
 
warrants as tools for evaluating the course readings,
 
suggesting a less restrictive agenda for the course than its
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media critics claimed to have discovered. Another critical
 
thinking text, Howard Kahane'S Logic and Contemporary
 
Rhetoric, is distinguished by its accessibility, its
 
emphasis on current topical examples, and its discussion of
 
"impediments to reasoning" (provincialism, loyalty, wishful
 
thinking, etc.) to complement the usual material on
 
fallacies. Some texts, such as Axelrod and Cooper's St.
 
Martin's Guide to Writing, take a middle position, offering
 
both subjective and objective modes of discourse in
 
sufficient quantity to enable the teacher to emphasize one
 
approach or the other, according to the teacher's preference
 
or the perceived needs Of the class. Like most composition
 
texts, St. Martin's contains a section on logical fallacies
 
and how to avoid them. Most chapters present a "Guides for
 
Writing" section that provides invention and organizing
 
strategies tailored for the particular mode under focus. In
 
general, today's composition texts incorporate at least some
 
principles from informal logic. But I found no recent text
 
that follows the model of Martin, making instruction in
 
logic central to the teaching of composition. More typical
 
of current trends is Linda Flowei's Problem-solving
 
Strategies for Writers. This book mentions logic only in
 
passing, giving instead practical advice on prganization,
 
invention, etc. The "issue tree," elements from
 
Ghristenseh's "generative rhetorics," and Rogerian argument
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are ■ presented, the organizing prihciple being Flowers' goal 
of making the ibenefits of traditional fhetorid and modern
 
scholarship avaiia^^ to the writer at the point of need.
 
Judging from the sample I reviewed, the presentation of
 
logic in the college composition classroom, once a
 
systematic undertaking, is now done haphazardly as interest
 
in it wanes, and as other activities, notably
 
autobiographical writing, compete successfully for
 
instruction time.
 
The logic that does get taught is alarmingly deficient
 
in the opinion of Fulkerson, who takes the writers of
 
■ composition textbooks to task for their shortcomings as 
logicians. Noting that the texts deal with at least two 
paradigms--logic, and writing as process--Fulkerson finds 
that the logic component often fails to integrate with the 
writing process as presented. The breakdown occurs because 
the process that the student would have to follow to meet 
the criteria of the logic component is not delineated. 
"Almost never do the two paradigms meet in composition 
textbooks" (Fulkerson 445). Only one, Rottenberg's Elements 
of Argument. integrates the two to Fulkerson's satisfaction. 
One reason for this bleak assessment is, I suspect, the lack 
of time and space to do justice to the complexity of the 
subject. This situation results in the emphasis on fallacy, 
which he shows to be inherently negative. "It [fallacy 
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theory] tells studehts some argumentative moves to avoid,
 
but not how to reason well" (443). Perhaps more significant
 
is the fact that, as a group, the present (indeed, the last
 
several) generations of composition teachers have not had
 
formal training in logic themselves, beyond a course or two
 
as undergraduates. , From medieval times through the middle
 
of the last century, the educated elite knew both rhetoric
 
and logic. As we have seen, the link between the two
 
disciplines underwent severe strain with the demise of
 
classical rhetoric and the rise of middle-period (Boolean)
 
logic. The link snapped at the century's turn when the
 
elective curriculum pulled against the quantum advances in
 
logic under Russell. The resulting gap has been partially
 
plugged by informal logic, but rhetorical theory has been so
 
changeable in recent years that authors of textbooks have
 
had difficulty formulating an approach to logic that mates
 
with their approach to rhetoric.
 
If logic is important in the teaching of composition,
 
then the field of composition studies is at, or near, a
 
point of crisis. Logic is still taught, but often in a
 
fragmentary way that fails to integrate logic's discipline
 
with the writing process. The emphasis given to concerns of
 
logic has waned while the process model has emerged as the
 
dominant paradigm in the field, and subjective rhetoric has
 
challenged the traditional logic-based pedagogy. There is
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no consensus or operating ag^reement on what if any logic
 
should be taught in the composition classroom, and how to
 
teach it. Many academics, both within and without the
 
field, are at best skeptical toward logic, and sometimes
 
openly hostile toward it, even while using it in their own
 
rhetoric. There is in progress a debate within academia
 
about the validity and place of logic, the outcome of which
 
will determine the fate of logic as it relates to
 
composition. If there is no outcome, we will continue to
 
muddle through.
 
The current debate is a continuation of a very old one.
 
As we have seen, Zeno ridiculed logic a century before
 
Aristotle, whose works have been attacked periodically down
 
through the ages. But the current debate adds new
 
perspectives that need to be listened to. Before advancing
 
my opinions on how the debate ought to be resolved, I shall
 
briefly consider some of these new perspectives. My
 
personal bias has not been lost on the attentive reader. I
 
am arguing for the re-strengthening of logic across the
 
curriculum, not just within composition studies. For this
 
position to be persuasive, prbponents of the logic-based
 
curriculum will have bo answer its coritemporary critics, and
 
to do this, i must consider, however briefly, the cultural
 
ramfications of the debate, giving particular focus to the
 
problem of the survival of democracy in the post-modern
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cultural environment
 
IV
 
Deconstruction, reader-response criticism,
 
multiculturalism and feminism deserve to be treated in far
 
more depth than I have space for here. But they have some
 
common elements, including a shared critique of logic that
 
is implicit in their approach to knowledge-making, and often
 
stated explicitly. The four movements overlap in
 
membership; most of the humanities professors and
 
instructors I've met consider themselves members of all four
 
groups, or are at least sympathetic to their goals. They
 
have each had a transforming impact on campus, and feminism
 
has rearranged the cultural and political landscape of
 
America. I have heard Derrida and Tompkins discussed in
 
high school faculty rooms; feminist and multi-culturalist
 
input has re-written the high school literature anthology
 
and seems poised to re-write the canon of required
 
book-length works as well. These forces beg for inclusion
 
in any discussion of logic.
 
As Culler points out, Derrida and deMan were capable of
 
minute logical explication of texts, but their method was to
 
push to the point where logic can no longer account for the
 
phenomenon under study (usually but not necessarily a
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literary text), and then move beyond that point. Culler
 
quotes Miller: "In fact, the moment when logic fails in
 
their work is the moment of their deepest penetration. "
 
(Culler 23). The irrational, or the "uncanny," is thus in
 
deconstruction privileged over logic. As an instrument of
 
literary criticism, it is hard to find fault with
 
deconstruction On this ground. Literary works, after all,
 
are not exercises in logic. But the success of
 
deconstruction has worked to discredit logic generally,
 
partly by the repeated spectacle of logic failing to deliver
 
the most convincing readings, but also because
 
deconstruction set itself in opposition not only to
 
formalistic analysis, but also to the more recent critical V
 
approaches of structuralism and semiotics, all of which are
 
logic-based and positivistic (Miller's formulation, with
 
which Culler voices reservations). Properly understood,
 
deconstruction affirms what most critics, even the most
 
traditional, have long known to be true--that logic can't
 
"read" a literary work, or prove one reading superior to
 
another.
 
Reader-response criticism has had the same effect of
 
upsetting traditional assumptions about how to read a
 
literary text. A reaction against the practice of close
 
analysis of texts in isolation from their social contexts
 
and circumstances of creatibn, reader response is to the
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reader what deconstruction is to the critic. It removes
 
responsibility for meaning-making from author and text, and
 
places it on the reader. With responsibility comes power
 
and authority. Since different readers produce different
 
readings, it follows that no definitive, "correct" reading
 
can be proved. Logic stresses correctness; it dictates that
 
two contradictory accounts of the same object cannot both be
 
true. Therefore, at least in literary criticism, logic
 
dictates that logic won't work. Reader-response criticism
 
thus has a deconstructing effect on formalistic analysis.
 
Multiculturalism is a growing force on campus that
 
appears to have a glorious future, given the increasing
 
diversity of the university community and the demographics
 
of society at large. Multiculturalist theory is suspicious
 
of logic, and even more suspicious of positivism. Speaking
 
for previously marginalized cultural groups, James Banks
 
presses the claim that "knowledge is positional, that it
 
relates to the knower's values and experience..." (Banks,
 
23). He condemns "positivist" critics of multiculturalism,
 
mentioning Leo, D'Souza, and Schlesinger. Banks doesn't
 
attack logic or rationalism explicitly; instead he advances
 
a taxonomy of five kinds of knowledge: personal/cultural,
 
popular, mainstream academic, transformative, and school
 
knowledge. Transformative knowledge, which "challenges the
 
facts, concepts, paradigms, themes and explanations
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routinely accepted in mainstream academic knowledge" {26),
 
appears to be privileged over mainstream academic, which is
 
on an equal footing with personal/cultural and popular
 
knowledges Banks' approach, like Berlin's epistemic
 
rhetoric/ seeks to undermine the certainties and
 
complacencies of traditional scholarship. Logic, especially
 
the formal kind, proceeds from one certainty to the next
 
along pathways designed to eliminate error. Thus the
 
logic-based pedagogy and the multi-culturalist agenda appear
 
to be worlds apart. But they needn't be. The bridge between
 
them is the emerging discipline of informal logic, which
 
deals not with absolute certainty, but with claims, warrants
 
and inferences whose validity is subject to analysis and
 
testing If proponents of logic can present a pedagogy that
 
values new lines of inquiry, promoting standards that don't
 
automatically choke off non-standard forms of knowledge,
 
they may yet find sympathetic ears within the multi-cultural
 
movement. If they can't, they will find rough sledding in
 
today's campus environment.
 
, There exists within feminist studies a vigorous
 
anti-rational strain, and another of equally vigorous
 
rational argument. The reconciliation of these two strains
 
has proved problematic for feminists. There have been many
 
feminist attacks on what Ayim calls the "rejection of the
 
emotional and affective realm in the name of reason" (Ayim
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190). Such writers see logic as part of the male, rational,
 
abstract, positivist and ultimately destructive dominant
 
thesis in Western culture, as opposed to the female,
 
emotional, natural, relativist and nurturing antithesis.
 
The trap here is that the essential difference between men
 
and women implied by such a formulation may leave women on
 
the margin of serious scholarship, or reinforce the
 
stereotype of female deficiency in reasoning ability.
 
Zawacki recognizes the danger of identifying gender with
 
forms of discourse, yet "we may have to risk focusing on
 
gender difference if we want to hear voices which have been
 
marginalized or silenced by our own insistence on rational
 
argument as the prevailing mode of discourse in the academy"
 
(Zawacki, 34). Feminist rhetoric thus often privileges the
 
subjective over the objective. As Lamb notes, "Current
 
discussion of feminist approaches to teaching composition
 
emphasize the writer's ability to find her own voice through
 
open-ended, exploratory, often autobiographical writing in
 
which she assumes a sympathetic audience." While supporting
 
these approaches. Lamb raises the possibility that the
 
audience might not be sympathetic; what then? Both Lamb and
 
Zawacki work toward a feminist style of argument that seeks
 
to build bridges of understanding between rhetor and
 
audience, rather than pitting one against the other until a
 
knockout blow is landed. Still, Lamb sees the need for
 
73
 
"monologic" argutnent "at the early stages of resolving a
 
conflict, when both parties need to be as clear as possible
 
about what they think and feel" (11).
 
This conflict within feminism poses a dilemma for
 
Culler, a male feminist who clearly wants the favor of both
 
camps. "For women writers," he states, "the question has
 
been whether to adopt 'male' modes of writing and prove
 
themselves 'master' of it or whether to develop a
 
specifically fetninine mode of discourse, whose superior
 
virtues they might hope to demonstrate" (Culler 172). His
 
answer is that "the example of deconstruction suggests the
 
importance of working on two fronts at once, even though the
 
result is a contradictory rather than a unified movement"
 
(173). The lack Of logical consistency here is potentially
 
more than just a temporary embarrassment to feminism. If it
 
is decided that women do indeed write less logically than
 
men, they will either take a back seat in the academy, or
 
re-write the rules of academic discourse. At present, the
 
drive is to re-write the rules.
 
Proponents of these alternative voices share the
 
dilemma of haying to employ the traditional rational
 
discourse of the academy to undermine the academy's
 
traditional logocentric bias. The need for a theory to
 
resolve this contradiction helps explain the increased
 
interest in transactional and epistemic rhetorics. It may
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also help explain Stanley Fish. The debate over how
 
knowledge is made--over what constitutes a fact, and whether
 
and when human certainty is ever justified--is one of
 
philosophy's oldest discussions. In the course of framing
 
this debate as a clash between "foundationalism" and
 
"anti-foundationalism," Fish has put forth a theory that
 
allows for rational argument while calling into question the
 
quest for Objectivity that drives traditional academic
 
research. Deservedly, he is required reading in graduate
 
rhetoric classes, and anyone seeking to buttress the
 
position of logic in the curriculum will have to confront
 
his ideas.
 
We may start by observing, in frank admiration, what an
 
inspired rhetorical coinage the word foundationalism is.
 
Nearly rhyming with "creationism" and related by etymology
 
and alliteration to "fundamentalism," foundationalism
 
resonates of religious revivals--of the small congregations
 
with long names that rock away Sundays in the basements of
 
hardware stores in towns a hundred miles to the right of
 
Tupelo, while smarter folks exchange patronizing grins on
 
the sidewalks outside. Practically no one in academia
 
admits to being a foundationaiist, and few outside the
 
academy have ever heard the term, so the foundationaiist
 
congregation ought to be a small one. As it turns out,
 
though, it's rather large. A lot of us belong in that
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basement. A "foundationalist" is someone who attempts "to
 
ground inquiry and communication in something more firm and
 
stable than mere belief and unexamined practice" (Fish 342).
 
Fish enumerates a few such grounds: "...God, the material
 
world, rationality in general and logic in particular, a
 
neutral-observation language, the set of eternal values, and
 
the free and independent self" (343). For the
 
anti-foundationalist, all knowledge is "situated," meaning
 
that it occurs in the context of the knower's own bundle of
 
tacit assumptions. To paraphrase the argument, it is
 
impossible to achieve a neutral, objective position from
 
which to make or evaluate knowledge, or even to focus one's
 
attention on one's own situation thoroughly enough to grasp
 
what that situation might be. The act of examining one's
 
own mental processes is still situated, still
 
context-driven. Objectivity is thus impossible. So the
 
whole rationalist enterprise is doomed the moment it fixes
 
on absolutes. A corollary to anti-foundationalism is that
 
anti-foundationalism itself can't take the place of the
 
other debunked absolutes. Awareness of situatedness does
 
not make one less situated. Fish insists. So we're thrown
 
back on what we already "know," which is good enough to
 
muddle through. We may still make rational arguments.
 
(Fish's essay is self-consciously logical and avails itself
 
of logical signifiers: In short, conversely, then surely.
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since, thus, to put the matter in a nutshell. But we
 
delude ourselves if we believe that such argutrients are
 
anchored outside our own personal and cultural histories.
 
What are the implications of anti-foundationalism for
 
the teaching of Composition? None, avers Fish, dashing the
 
hopes of theorists--he mentions Bruffee, Bizzell, Lanham and
 
Scholes--who have sought to make anti-foundationalism the
 
theoretical basis of reform within the field. Such efforts
 
run the risk of making a foundation out of anti­
foundationalism, a trap Fish seems determined to avoid.
 
We're approaching an old philosophical paradox here. The
 
statement that there are no absolutes is itself an absolute,
 
which casts doubt on the original premise. The anti­
foundationalist dilemma recalls Descartes. Cognito ergo sum
 
uses logic to proceed from situation to rationalism (and to
 
the existence of a sympathetic God). Anti-foundationalists
 
have little use for rationalism or God, of course. But
 
might it be possible to start with the fact of situation and
 
build a theoretical structure that has some utility in
 
teaching writing? Toner believes she has found such a
 
structure in the field of teacher research, which she
 
presents as a mode of inquiry that is narrative and
 
contextualized, rather than objective and de-contextualized.
 
(See her conclusion, p. 25). She rejects Fish's denial of
 
the link between theory and practice. In any event, we may
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read her claims for teacher research in light of the
 
examples of "theory hope" cited by Fish (see especially his
 
discussion of Bizzell, P- 344)/ and conclude that the
 
attempts thus far to inform the teaching of composition with
 
anti-foundationalist theoty have either explicitly attacked
 
logic or promoted non-logical forms of discourse. We may
 
expect that further attempts to link this theory with
 
practice will come at the expense of logic. Indeed, the
 
anti-foundationalism of Fish is practically the same animal
 
as the epistemic rhetoric of Berlin, and may become, or may
 
be already, the new conventional wisdom, at least at the
 
graduate level.
 
I share Fish's skepticism about the applicability of
 
anti- foundationalism to practice, while opting not to
 
participate in his elevation of situated, tacit knowledge to
 
the forefront of knowledge-making activity. Such elevation
 
strikes me as sentimental. The fact of situatedness is
 
intuitively obvious, but its significance ought not to be
 
over-stated. While philosophy may insist that pure
 
objectivity is humanly impossible, the natural sciences have
 
proven the power of assuming objectivity for the sake of a
 
given experiment. Taking the example of Galileo, sometimes
 
thought of as the father of experimental science: There is
 
no doubt that aspects of his situation influenced his work.
 
But such influence is of chiefly biographical interest.
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What counts whah on events that
 
expose the situatednessof his career--the revisions to the
 
Law of the pendulum made nece by modern measurement
 
techniques, for instance--is to quibble at the margins of
 
his accomplishments. ; By demonstrating the validity of
 
Copernicus' view of the solar system, he rendered ridiculous
 
the "tacit knowledge" of all the preceding generations of
 
humanity, at least as it related to astronomy. Perhaps we
 
should give most of the credit to Copernicus; perhaps some
 
of it to Ptolemy. We're still quibbling. The point is that
 
a man, or a few men, using observation and assuming an
 
objective stance, employed reason to remove the blinders
 
from mankind in relation to a rather basic area of
 
knowledge.
 
Insofar as science is driven by induction, which
 
asserts probability but not certainty, and considering that
 
deductive reasoning by humans is subject to human error, it
 
will always be possible to nip at the heels of scientific
 
discovery, to keep all questions open. I cannot prove that
 
the earth revolves around the sun, or even that I exist, to
 
one determined to remain skeptical. Moreover, scientists do
 
make mistakes. What was thought to be a universal principle
 
might stand revealed after further inquiry as an isolated
 
quirk, or wrong altogether, the projection of a situated
 
being who was too eager to publish, whose children
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distracted him, or who was in trouble with the Pope. Yet,
 
the objectivist enterprise endures. Mistakes are corrected
 
aiid: newjdi'scoveri^^ made.f Sibiiated scientist, assuming
 
objactivity debunk tacit knowledge, and science bestrides
 
the academy like a colossus, confident in the knowledge that
 
its airplanes fly, its computers crunch, and its healing
 
arts cushion many of the shocks that flesh is heir to.
 
Anti-foundationalism isn't wrong, but how relevant is it in
 
the face of such demonstrated power?
 
I imagine that scientists enmeshed in the highly
 
theoretical tangle of contemporary research, such as taking
 
measurements of sub-atomic particles or distant galaxies,
 
are themselves anti-foundationalists much of the time.
 
Their method, though, requires grounding their inquiry in a
 
foundation, probably "rationality in general and logic in
 
particular." The possibility of being a part-time
 
anti-foundationalist would be absurd to a "card-carrying
 
anti-foundationalist" like Fish. But the great philosopher-

scientists seemed able to live and work in situations of
 
theoretical ambiguity, "believing in" and practicing a
 
scientific method while searching for a better one. The
 
Aristotle of the syllogism was also the Aristotle of the
 
enthymeme. Descartes' quest for certainty led him to
 
abandon all inherited wisdom and start from scratch, using
 
rationally validated methods; he was a foundationalist to
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 the core. In contrast "philosophical claims.. . are
 
more modest, and more experimental, than those of Descartes"
 
(Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 82). Toulmin's account of Newton
 
places him in the "anti" column, at least most of the time.
 
The careers of Newton and Descartes suggest that what Fish
 
finds true of composition instruction is also ttue of
 
science: We learn by doing, by making use of materials at
 
hand, including "rationalism in general and logic in
 
particular," and our performance isn't much affected by the
 
weight we give to epistemological theory.
 
Anti-foundationalism cides not inhibit Fish from using
 
rational argument and stating his conclusions forcefully.
 
But those conclusions, if taken to heart, would remove
 
some of the pillars supporting traditional Western
 
scholarship--the Socratic search for self-knowledge and
 
universal truth, for instance--and utterly transform the way
 
the academy conceives of the function of!ed,ucation (such
 
transformation, of course, is Fish's goal). Gonsider the
 
following:
 
...I have nothing to say against this goal [of
 
democratic liberalism]--at least not here--except
 
that it is incompatible with ahti-foundationalism
 
because it assumes the possibility of getting a
 
perspective on one's beliefs, a perspective from
 
which those beliefs can be evaluated and compared
 
with the similarly evaluated beliefs of
 
others...what anti-foundationalism teaches is the
 
inescapability of situatedness> and if situatedness
 
is inescapable, students could not possibly identify
 
in non-evaluative ways their own beliefs, because as
 
situated beings Some set of beliefs of which they
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could not be aware would:be enabiing any
 
. identification they might make; and, therefore, the
 
act of identification would from the very first be
 
evaluative through and through. One could escape
 
this logic only be saying that while the operations
 
of the mind are always a function of context, in one
 
operatiOn--the identification of its own context and
 
that of Cithers--it is independent. Such an
 
exemption is obviously contradictory...(350)
 
The use pf sy11ogistic 1ogic to prove anti-foundationalism
 
strikes me as ironic, and I wonder if logic hasn't led Fish
 
into shallow waters here. Self-knowledge, we are led to
 
conclude, is impossible. Not elusive, as Socrates would
 
have it, but impossible. Fish's consolation--the
 
sufficiency of our tacit knowledge--would not have sufficed
 
for Socrates, who pushed onward in pursuit of universal
 
truth in defiance of the Sophists' contention that truth
 
cannot be proved, that all questions can be argued both
 
ways. Should it suffice for us? Fish states his case in
 
absolute terms; awareness of situation offers no "purchase"
 
on our situations. The picture I get is of a climber whose
 
every step upward brings him slipping back down to his
 
original position; or of a half-blind sojourner whose
 
horizon recedes before him and trails along behind, with no
 
milestone to measure movement, much less a reachable goal.
 
Such a life is not only unexamined, but unexaminable. My
 
own experience of life is better described, I think, by the
 
old "onion" metaphor. The personality is formed by layers;
 
self-understanding, by the critical mind peeling back the
 
82
 
layers to search out the inner core. There are always more
 
layers, but in the time race between self-knowledge and
 
death, some get much closer to the tore than others, and for
 
reasons tther^t mere longevity...An alternative metaphor
 
combines the climber with Zeno's arrow. We may never reach
 
the pinnacTe of self-knowledge, but by halving the distance,
 
and halving it again, we begin to approximate wisdom.
 
Perhaps I delude myself, but awareness of situation does
 
give us some purchase--quite a bit of purchase--on the
 
slippery slope. Our understanding is never perfect. We'll
 
never get to the top. But the higher we go, the more we can
 
see of our situation, though not enough of it to satisfy
 
Fish. I can answer his absolute statements on situatedness
 
only by a weak relativistic insistence that, while we can
 
never know our whole situation at once, we Can know more of
 
it that we did last year.
 
Which points up an interesting paradox. Fish, along
 
with like-minded critics of logocentrism in the
 
deconstruGtionist, feminist, and multi-culturalist camps,
 
has good reason to be fond of logical argument. Logic likes
 
to proceed from certainty. When one holds, as Fish does,
 
that the only certain thing is that there is no certainty,
 
one has a foundation, albeit a narrow one, on which to build
 
an argument. From the premise "all knowledge is situated,"
 
one derives "no knowledge is certain," stated as a
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certaihty. The narrowness of the foundation is glimpsed in
 
Fish's concession that his theory lacks a methodological
 
payoff. Anti-foundationalism is inherently negative and
 
iconoclastic. Conversely, foundationalism, taken here to
 
mean the assumption of objectivity and use of "rationalism
 
in general and logic in particular" to make new knowledge,
 
is in a weaker logical position. It has to assert certainty
 
beyond uncertainty, and as it does so, it invites the
 
ridicule of Sophists like Fish. It has to come up with a
 
convincing result--space travel, say, or the discovery of
 
DNA--to silence, momentarily, the bench jockeys of
 
post-modern relativism.
 
Is objectivity really impossible? In the strict
 
philosophical sense, I suppose it is. But the pursuit and
 
near-attainment of it is hugely powerful. Objectivity loses
 
the game of philosophy and wins the test of pragmatism. The
 
situated self is escapable only through death, though
 
perhaps Fish would regard death as the ultimate,
 
irreversible situation. But an escape from self,
 
metaphorical but still powerful, seems to occur when one is
 
wholly engaged in something like scientific research, or
 
acting on stage, or a competitive game of chess. Consider
 
the latter activity. Chess is a game of situation, played
 
by situated beings. I don't doubt that chess strategy often
 
mirrors the personality of the players (the mercurial Fisher
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being the premier American example). Moreover, the
 
situation is fluid, even between moves, as the players
 
anticipate their opponent's responses and plan responses of
 
their own. Yet, the game is a supreme test of objectivity.
 
Poor players obsess on their own strategy, hopes and fears.
 
Good players often talk of "losing themselves" in the game.
 
They stay focused on the pieces--the objects--and the rules
 
which govern their movement. At the game's highest levels,
 
chess moves are much more a function of logic than of
 
situatedness. Indeed, computer chess programs are starting
 
to win grandmaster tournaments as their logic increases in
 
complexity. :
 
"Modern anti-foundationalism is old sophism writ
 
analytic," Fish suggests (347), reminding us that the debate
 
we're discussing is a renewal of a longer one that goes back
 
to Socrates and the Sophists. The Sophist side is the
 
safer, in that it is always easier to find flaws in someone
 
else's search for the truth than to undertake such a search
 
for oneself. By valuing and bringing out the existing tacit
 
knowledge of his students, as well as by his insistence upon
 
his own ignorance, the Socrates we see in the Platonic
 
dialogues shows his awareness of and respect for the
 
Sophist-anti-foundationalist position. But he was not
 
content with "mere belief and unexamined practice" as the
 
grounds for knowledge. He pursued self-knowledge and
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universal truth in spite of the pitfalls, and urged his
 
stxadents to do the sa^O. The power of'I the So
 
tradition derives in large measure from the foregrounding of
 
rational inquiry in the context of an awareness of logic's
 
limits. Such awareness enables us to critique our inquiry
 
as we conduct it.
 
It is critically important, though, that our awareness
 
of logic's limits not inhibit us from using logic, and
 
teaching it in the composition classroom. Such inhibition
 
could easily happen in today's academic environment. In his
 
account of Derrida on Freud, Culler discusses a series of
 
dualities, in which the first term is privileged over the
 
second, but is also in some way derivative of it: the
 
conscious mind v the unconscious; life v death; male v
 
female. In seeking to overturn hierarchical relationships
 
among humans, Derrida insists on a period of "reversal," of
 
privileging the second term over the first for however long
 
it takes to overturn the thinking or habit that led to the
 
imbalance in the first place. There is pressure from many
 
feminist and deconstructionist radicals to reverse the terms
 
in some of the dualities we've been discussing: objective y
 
subjective, positivist v relativist, rational v various
 
other ways of knowing, and indeed, male y female. How much
 
"reversal" is occurring behind the closed doors of
 
composition classrooms is impossible to determine. My sense
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of it is that the large majority of teachers of freshman
 
composition still devote significant instruction time to
 
argumentative writing. But winds of change are blowing
 
across campus, and the unpreparedness of entering freshmen
 
in logical ways of thinking and writing puts many of them at
 
risk of failure to meet traditional standards. The
 
pressures of this situation have given the momentum to the
 
second term, at least on most college campuses. Today's
 
students are tomorrow's teachers, and I think we have reason
 
to fear for the future of logic when today's Fish-fed
 
graduate students meet Butthead in tomorrow's composition
 
classroom.
 
My concern is that support for critical thinking and
 
logic in the curriculum, especially in Composition, will
 
continue to wane at a time when we shall need them more than
 
ever. The "we" here is the body politic, and the need is to
 
cure the radical anti-rationalism of the post-modern age
 
with the only antidote available--a rational education.
 
The problem of maintaining democratic institutions in
 
the post-modern environment is the subject of many articles
 
and books, including a recent one by Harper's editor Lewis
 
Lapham, The Wish for Kings: Democracy at Bay. Lapham
 
characterizes the post-modern imagination as a "product of
 
the mass media," whose "vocabulary is necessarily primitive,
 
reducing argument to gossip and history to the telling of
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fairy tales. Like the old pagan systems of belief, the mass
 
media grant the primacy of the personal over the impersonal"
 
(Lapham M2) sees the ah^
 
anti-meaning aspects of contemporary culture as analagous to
 
paganism and fears the destructipn of the rational impulse,
 
which comes harder to humanity than the telling of stories,
 
but is necessary for democracy to function. In this thesis
 
he echoes Neil Postman's 1979 book. Teaching as a Conserving
 
Activity. Postman was a I960's radical whose earlier book,
 
Teaching as a Subversive Activity, attacked the traditional
 
pedagogy, especially the emphasis on factual knowledge.
 
Conserving reveals a conversion of the author from radical
 
to conservative. Postman sees the electronic media as the
 
"first curriculum," the most powerful influence in the lives
 
of the young. The first curriculum undermines the second,
 
that of the traditional classroom that values and models
 
inquiry. The media offer fragmented, superficial content
 
that is visual or sensual rather than intellectual,
 
resulting in the short attention spans and insistence on
 
instant gratification that educators have bemoaned since
 
television first appeared in large numbers of American
 
living rooms. Popular culture, both authors contend, is
 
ruining our children's ability to think.
 
Postman's thesis is that education should function as a
 
"thermostat" or counterweight to cultural trends that become
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tod extreme. Schddl should re-define itself to correct
 
serious imbalances. He proposes a return to a rigorous
 
traditipnal academ classroom in which knowledge of the
 
"logic" of each discipline would be a major goal of
 
instruction. In short, school should function as the true
 
counter-culture, in the hope of turning out well-rounded
 
citizens. His aim is not the restoration of positivism, nor
 
does he argue for studying logic in isolation from other
 
subjects. Conserving is informed by modern rhetorical
 
theory and allows for the existence of many "logics." Each
 
subject has its "rhetoric of knowledge, a characteristic way
 
in which arguments, proofs, speculations, experiments,
 
polemics, even humor, are expressed" (Postman, 162).
 
Education should not withhold the logical and rhetorical
 
bases of the subjects it teaches, but rather should place
 
high priority on imparting them to students.
 
Postman's approach strikes me as timely today, but the
 
creation of a school culture strong enough to stand up to
 
the youth culture will not be easy, especially in troubled
 
districts. Teachers today find themselves pressured to make
 
huge accommodations in the classroom to maintain order and
 
ensure their own survival, much less compete with the "first
 
curriculum." With justification, teachers feel themselves
 
agents of a dozen agendas, many of which are imposed from
 
outside the school community. Principals, administrators,
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teachers' unions and parent groups vary widely in their
 
tolerance of change. The current move toward local
 
autonomy, itself a reaction to the crisis in public
 
education, will make top-down reform harder to effect. And
 
classes are too big and money is too scarce...the litany is
 
familiar to us all. Any prescription I could make becomes
 
an exercise in Utopian dreaming once it gets outside my own
 
classroom door. But dream we must, especially if the stakes
 
are the viability of the democratic institutions we claim to
 
value so highly.
 
V
 
in proposing the "strengthening" of logic in education,
 
I am not suggesting simply requiring the study of formal
 
Aristotelian or Boolean or Russellian logic, in the hope
 
that the mental discipline derived therefrom will transfer
 
to general situations. Carroll and others have claimed such
 
transferability for logic (see Carroll, p. 24 onward, and
 
Emmet, ix). Such claims seem plausible to me, but I was
 
able to find no research results that back them up. Nor do
 
T advocate a scattering of units on critical thinking up and
 
down the curriculum. We have suffered through enough
 
piecemeal reforms to know that they aren't effective, and
 
I'm convinced that a "rational education," however we may
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define such an edifice, cannot be built on the cheap. The
 
medieval trivium that we post-moderns find quaint was the
 
rough equivalent of our undergraduate degree. It should not
 
surprise us that the fragmentary exposure our students
 
receive to a lightweight critical thinking pedagogy fails to
 
result in mastery, or to prepare high school graduates for
 
college-level writing. Fulkerson describes an experiment in
 
which two groups of students were taught informal logic in
 
two different ways; when their writing was compared to that
 
of a control group to see if the logic instruction "took,"
 
the results were not encouraging. The lack of research
 
support for the current critical thinking pedagogy reflects,
 
I believe, the unfortunate reality that 40 hours of the best
 
instruction one might hope to receive cannot in isolation
 
counterbalance sixteen years of brain-numbing exposure to
 
the electrified grunts that constitute our children's first
 
curriculum.
 
All this is another way of suggesting that logic, of
 
all disciplines, is least amenable to haphazard attention.
 
An essential quality of logic is that it proceeds
 
cumulatively, like math. We insist on an orderly
 
presentation of the math curriculum, with yearly review so
 
that students who fall behind can catch up. We should
 
follow this model for logic. Indeed, the math curriculum is
 
the closest thing our students get to an organized approach
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to critical thinking; its contributioh to their;development
 
goes far beyond mere manipulation of numbers. But the
 
English curriculum, writing instruction, and critical
 
thinking remain fragmented, and our students are missing
 
somethihg important. ;They are missing a coherent
 
presentation of the methods by which reason, which is
 
exercised abstiractly in math, can be brought to bear on
 
problems whose solutions, if they exist at all, lie outside
 
the realm of numbers. And to the extent this is true, they
 
are missing an informed appreciation of the limits of logic,
 
as well. Just as one cannot grasp the limits of calculus
 
without mastering calculus, so our students cannot benefit
 
from the various critiques of logic without first learning a
 
fair amount of logic. I hope Fish would agree that it
 
accomplishes nothing to ridicule foundationalism or
 
positivism in class and expect students to become
 
anti-foundationalists on faith. They need space to explore
 
positivism, think about the human needs that foster it,
 
examine their own positivist assumptions, and meditate on
 
the implications of their possible abandonment. They get
 
none of these things from the first curriculum, and little
 
of them from the second as it now exists through high
 
school.
 
Although I'm concerned for the future of logic in the
 
teaching of composition on the college level, at present,
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the problem lies in what is happening, or not happening, in
 
K-12 education. Fulkerson's findings aside, teachers of
 
freshman composition do not lack the means and materials for
 
teaching the logical modes of discourse. The most
 
widelv-used text (The St. Martin's Guide to Writing)
 
contains more than enough material on logic to occupy the
 
instructor who wishes to emphasize logical writing. - We need
 
to solve the problem where it is. The project of countering
 
the first curriculum must reach down into the early grades
 
and extend across the curriculum. It should be as coherent
 
as the discipline of logic itself. And its aim should be
 
not the restoration of positivism, but the cultivation of
 
rational, critical, autonomous thinking in each new
 
generation of American citizens.
 
Several disciplines have advanced themselves for the
 
role of tying things together. As we have seen, scholars in
 
rhetoric are making the case for the restoration of their
 
discipline to the center of the curriculum. In part to
 
support such a restoration, they give rhetoric a much
 
broader definition than "the art of persuasion." Hence
 
Knoblauch: "...rhetoric is the process of using language to
 
organize human experience and communicate it to others. It
 
is also the study of how people use language to organize and
 
communicate experience" (Knoblauch 29). So global a
 
definition invites the elevation of rhetofic to the position
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of arbiter of knowledge-making activity, the role I had
 
cohceived for logic in the early stages of researching this
 
paper., ,
 
Lunsford makes a similar claim for the field of
 
cognitive studies. She draws attention to the relationship
 
between writing and thinking in a way that suggests support
 
for "rational education,"but avoids the L-word: "It seems
 
clear, then, that ...the cognitive strategies of
 
generalizing, inferring, and abstracting are basic to
 
writing...student writers must be able to draw inferences
 
from the wealth of materials, observations and impressions
 
at their disposal in prder to conceptualize and sustain even
 
a very short piece of discourse...a writer must produce a
 
text that is able to sustain a reader's inferences about the
 
underlying conceptual structure" (Lunsford, 158, quoting
 
Bracewell, Frederiksen arid Frederiksen). Lunsford continues
 
with the observation, backed by "recent studies," that
 
"inferential reasoning skills are not taught until the last
 
years of high school, and then only sporadically and
 
unsystematically taught at best" (158). She notes the
 
difficulty our students have in academic writing, citing
 
Bartholomae, and advocates not a "quick pedagogical Cure,"
 
but a systematic application of the insights of her
 
discipline to achieve conceptual unity across the
 
curriculum, thus fulfilling the ancient goal of Cicero for a
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pedagogy that "would unite thought/ language and action"
 
Our students need more help with reasoning skills than
 
composition and critical thinking courses can by themselves
 
supply. In the current climate, such help should not be
 
called "logic." The last thing our students need is an
 
academic turf war. They need something (why not call it
 
"philosophy"?) to help them make sense of what they are
 
being taught. They are entitled to such help, it seems to
 
me, if we expect them to sort through the complexity of
 
post-modern life, see behind its false gods, and return the
 
level of public discourse to one consistent with enlightened
 
self-government.
 
The proposal that follows is both unrealistic and anti-

climatic. It is unrealistic in that it would strengthen
 
logic in defiance of the major currents of contemporary
 
educational thinking. It will be seen as anti-climatic by
 
teachers who may be looking for a detailed prescription, or
 
who may already be doing the things I suggest, none of which
 
are new. I propose nothing radical. I wish only to arrest
 
the pendulum as it swings toward a naive anti-rationalism,
 
and send it back far enough to ensure that the reductive
 
effects of the electronic culture find a counterweight in
 
the common pedagogy. Even that much asks a lot of the
 
school community, including our students, many of whom
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(those most in heed of a counterweight, probably) would
 
resist it. Thinking logically is hard. It is also, in the
 
form of the scientific method/ the dominant means of making
 
knowledge in the "hard sciences," and in its informal
 
manifestations, has value in nearly every activity that
 
involves rhetoric, analysis of texts, evaluation of
 
proposals, or application of abstract principles to human
 
affairs (i.e.. law and politics). Nearly every profession
 
requires logical proficiency in some form. Those who truly
 
wish to empower students should therefore insist upon a
 
curriculum that includes a solid grounding in logical
 
principles.
 
Such grounding should follow a few general guidelines.
 
First, the temptation to ratify the primacy of inductive
 
over deductive logic ought to be resisted. Both should be
 
taught. The distinction between deduction and induction,
 
and their combination to produce scientific inquiry, are too
 
important to gloss over. Second, as with any subject, logic
 
should be presented in increasing complexity as students
 
develop the intellectual capacity to access it. The math
 
curriculum might serve as a guide here. For example, since
 
deductive proofs are an integral part of geometry, which is
 
commonly taught in the 10th grade, it is reasonable to
 
assume that high school sophomores are developmentally ready
 
for the syllogism. Following the math model, logic should
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be presented in a cumulative and coherent way, with frequent
 
paralleis drawn between the two subjects so that they
 
reinforce each other. Finally, journal and autobiographical
 
writing should continue to be assigned and encouraged. With
 
Elbow, I believe that the doubting game and the believing
 
game can co-exist--should co-exist--if our goal is a
 
balanced education.
 
Who will teach the logic curriculum? In the elementary
 
grades, that would be the same person who teaches everything
 
else. When instruction becomes departmentalized, I believe
 
with Postman that the emphasis should be on having all
 
academic teachers teach the logic of their disciplines.
 
Math teachers already teach logic, and the recent movement
 
to stress concepts and applications over mechanics in math
 
instruction can only help prepare students for exposure to
 
logic in other classes. Science teachers are supposedly
 
already teaching the scientific method, and giving hands-on
 
training in the lab on how observation is translated into
 
new knowledge. Similarly, social science teachers should be
 
sharing with students the logic of their field. Or fields,
 
since the "logic" of history, if there is such a thing, is
 
quite different from the logic of, say, psychology. There
 
is certainly a rhetoric of history, meaning the set of
 
protocols by which historical questions are researched,
 
sources evaluated, and theses put forth and defended. Logic
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is also invoked by historians who see cause and effect
 
relationships between historical events, or analogies
 
between one lost civilization and another. Gradually, as
 
students are ready to assimilate them, the differences
 
between the terms and propositions of history and those of
 
"pure" logic should be worked into the curriculum. And so
 
it should go with controlled experiments in psychology, text
 
analysis in English, and so on.
 
The departmentalized approach has one obvious defect.
 
It speaks to the peculiar logics of each discipline, but not
 
to the quest for a unifying theory of knowledge. Students
 
would understand math and science and history better, but
 
would not get the benefit of an organized attempt to tie
 
things together until college, if then. I hope we can do
 
more to help students tie their learning together before
 
attempting college study, or leaving the educational system
 
completely. In the middle grades, I'd like to see a home
 
room or master teacher present Study skills and critical
 
thinking skills a day or two per week during the SSR
 
(Sustained silent reading) mini-periods that seem to be
 
ubiquitous now at this level. In high school, I'd like to
 
require, or at least offer, a "senior seminar" to help
 
students make sense of their education and prepare them for
 
futures as life-long learners and citizens. One semester of
 
it, called "psychology," would present the basics of human
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behavior, growth and development> family dynamlGS, and
 
personal relationships, inGludihg ethics, and uSe literary
 
texts as well as case studies and other readings. The othet
 
semester, called "philosophy/" would include logic and the
 
scientific method, and political philosophy, focusing on
 
some of the prominent shapers, so that high school graduates
 
could be presumed to know not just the names of Aristotle
 
and Darwin and Marx and Freud and a few others of that rank,
 
but something of how they thought and what they added to the
 
sum of human knowledge. Entering freshmen would take courses
 
in rhetoric and critical thinking as now, but with much
 
greater assurance that they would be ready.
 
What, exactly, should be taught? I'm not sure about
 
"exactly," but a few ideas suggest themselves to me. In
 
spite of having been told once by an education professor
 
that 9th graders aren't ready for abstract thinking, I'm
 
convinced that they are, or should be, and I've observed
 
children in the late elementary grades struggle impressively
 
with questions, such as the guilt or innocence Of certain
 
celebrity criminal defendants, that engage their interest
 
and require application of principles to cases, evaluation
 
of evidence, and distinctions between fact and assumption.
 
It is also true that the intellectual development of
 
children follows its own;individual timetable, and for that
 
reason, the logic curriculum in the early grades should be
 
99
 
kept simple and, where: possible, fun. Puzzles, games,
 
simple verbal analogies, speeGhes and debates, and writing
 
assignments that begin to work in logical concepts should be
 
part of the curriculum at this age. Writing instruction
 
should include organizational concepts like topic sentences
 
and paragraphing, introductions and conclusions, and
 
supporting evidence. Topics need not be abstruse. "The Gap
 
is better than Mervyn'S," or "the Chargers will make the
 
play-offs," will suffice at this level. The goals should be
 
to introduce the basics, follow student interest, and keep
 
it fun.
 
Seventh grade strikes me as time to re-introduce Lewis
 
Garroll. The Alice stories stand logic on its head while
 
ultimately supporting it {Alice becomes empowered when she
 
uses logic to critique the absurdities of the adult world,
 
but then must confront "reality"). The Alice experience
 
could be enriched with the whimsical puzzles that Carroll
 
devised to make the syllogism accessible to children in
 
their early teens. By eighth grade, students have had
 
enough algebra to enable them to digest a basic exposure to
 
symbolic logic, preferably in a unit that coordinates this
 
abstract exercise with material on fallacy and/or argument
 
analysis. Writing instruction in the middle grades should
 
include expository, analytical, and persuasive modes, as
 
well as creative and autobiographical, using set forms, such
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as the 5-paragraph expository essay, to meet the need of the
 
age group for structure. (But students who demonstrate
 
mastery of the forms and readiness to move beyond them
 
should be helped to do so). Journal writing should include
 
topics that require abstract thought and argument, such as
 
making and defending decisions on questions of values.
 
Reading and writing assignments that teach logic in engaging
 
ways should be developed and shared. (One example: assign
 
a mystery novel, have students keep a log of characters and
 
clues, and assign a series of short papers on who they think
 
did it, and why. Then have them trace and evaluate, perhaps
 
working in groups, the strategies by which the author built
 
suspense about the identity of the guilty party.) By the
 
ninth grade, students ought to be writing short but
 
competent 5-paragraph expositions and 4-paragraph arguments,
 
and simple analyses of literary texts. Also by this time,
 
students should be introduced to, and asked to explore in
 
their journals, such basic philosophical conflicts as
 
determinism v free will, personal freedom v social
 
obligation, and objective v subjective thinking.
 
By high school, the pre-set essay forms will have
 
outlived their usefulness and should be phased out in favor
 
of organic approaches in which the rhetorical situation
 
determines form. Teachers should be sharing basic rhetorical
 
theory in class as they present new writing assignments.
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They should be showing students how to use transitional
 
words and phrases to signal logical relationships, and how
 
to use concepts of grammar and style (such as coordination,
 
subordination, parallel cbnstruction, and verb tense) to
 
further reveal logical relationships. Students should be
 
thinking and writing about such questions as logic v
 
rhetoric, positivism y relativism, and scientific knowledge
 
y the humanities. Education at this level should encourage
 
students to focus their growing critical faculties on social
 
conditions, on powerful forces such as the media, and on the
 
tacit assumptions as well as the explicit ones that cultures
 
generate. By the end of high school, students should be
 
ready to make college the transforming experience it can be
 
when one's full intellect is engaged across several
 
disciplines at once.
 
For this to happen, and to meet the demands of college
 
writing, our students will need to be able to write
 
reasohably clear expository, analytical, and persuasive
 
prose. They'll need to be careful and thorough about
 
defining their terms, developing their arguments, providing
 
evidence, justifying their assertions, arid avoiding the
 
damaging inconsistencies, hasty generalizations, and other
 
fallacies that mar the writing of many of our students. They
 
need to become rhetoricians, using the available means of
 
persuasion and modes of discourse to meet a variety of
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writing situations. These should be the goals of freshman
 
composition. By strengthening logic in K-12 education, my
 
hope is to bring more of our incoming freshmen up to the
 
level of Our bette^^-prepared students. Freshman composition
 
teachers would then spend less time on remediation, and more
 
on rhetoric, broadly defined.
 
; Ed^^ can't force the young to abandon its popular-

culture, but it should work purposefully to mitigate its
 
nihiTistic and hedonistic tendencies, its hostility toward
 
reason and learning, its insistence on instant
 
gratification, its superficial worship of celebrity. It
 
must offer something better. Not sorrtething more comfortable
 
or entertaining, but something more challenging and
 
empowering. To survive and thrive in college and beyond,
 
and to function as effective and responsible citizens, our
 
young people need to learn to think critically and
 
communicate in the languages of knowledge and power.
 
Whether it wahts one or hot, we owe our current student
 
pppulation the benefits ;0f a rational education.
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